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FOREWORD
The 1983-84 Philippine balance-of-payments crisis affected all
sectors of the economy and all segmentsof society as it manifested
itself in the growing unemployment and underemployment prob-
lems, in the all-time high inflation rates, and in the unprecedented
contraction of the economy.
Many studies have been conducted and published about the un-
derlying causesof the economic crisis, but few have looked into the
government's response to it, as well as into the impact of this res-
ponseon such concernsasgrowth, employment and inflation.
This study attempts to document and critically evaluate the var-
ious stabilization measuresadopted by the Philippine Government in
responseto the 1983-84 balance-of-payments crisis. A number of re-
search fellows and consultants at the Philippine Institute for Deve-
lopment Studies have combined their efforts and expertise, and put
together this comprehensive and objective examination of the mea-
sures adopted by the Government as a direct reaction to the crisis
and of their effects on the growth prospects of the economy in the
short and medium term.
It is hoped that this Monograph will provide useful insights into
Philippine economic planning and policy making
'esident
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The balance-of-payments(BOP) difficulties of the country have
long historical roots. The economy has been characterizedby persis-
tent and increasingcurrent account deficits since 1975. Although
external factors, such as the rapid deterioration in the terms of trade
and the slowdown in the demand for exports could be cited ascon-
tributory factors, domestic policies played a significant role in creat-
ingthe 1983 economiccrisis.The exchangerate, which wasto a large
extent influenced by Central Bank (CB) intervention, was inconsis-
tent with movements in relative prices, thus encouragingmore im-
ports and discouragingexports. Both fiscal and monetary policies
were decidedly expansionarysince 1981. External borrowingsat high
interest rates were resorted to in order to finance the growing sav-
ings-investmentgap. This strategy was sensiblein the 70s when con-
ditions in the international financial markets were relatively favor-
able, but not in the 80s when OECD countriesstarted to pursue a
tight monetary policy and major international banks became more
cautious in lending as a result of defaults experienced by a number
of lessdevelopedcountries.
Interestingly, againstthe background of persistentand growing
current account and bulging budget deficits, the Philippinesembark-
ed on a liberalization program in the early part of the 1980s. In
1981, a tariff reform program which aims at eventually reachinga
more uniform tariff system in the rangeof 20 to 30 percent was ins-
tituted. Financial reforms were likewise introduced about the same
time. Deregulationof interest rates,narrowingfunctional distinctions
among different types of financial institutions, and reduction of re-
serverequirement ratio were amongthe significantfinancial reforms.
However, a development that runscounter to the liberalization prog-
ram wasthe phenomenalgrowth of the governmentcorporate sector,
particularly in the early 80s. This took two forms. One was in the
massive investments undertaken by existing government corpora-
tions. Another was the takeover by government through its various
instrumentalitiesof the so-called "vital industries" and the rescueof
several big distressedcorporations. Thus, government corporations,
particularly the thirteen non-financial and three financial corpora-
tions, incurred hugedeficits which exerted pressureson the national
budget. These were reflected as transfers and contributions of the
national government to the public corporate sector. In the final ana-
lysis, this resultedin risinggovernment spending,causingrising real
deficits and realexcessdemand.
XV
The balance-of-paymentsdifficulties became clearly unmanage-
able in the first half of 1983. The erodingconfidence in the economy
and the political system further aggravated the problems. The
Aquino assassinationand the CB disclosureson the international re-
serveswere two major market surprisesthat resultedin greater dis-
location since they were not predicted and properly discounted by
the market. Thus, when international lending institutionsceasedfur-
ther lending to the Philippinesand called in their maturing loans in
the secondhalf of 1983, the Philippineswascatapulted into its worst
balance-of-payments crisis unprecedented in its post-war history.
This clearly called for an immediate responsefrom the government.
The variousstabilization measuresadopted by governmentin res-
ponse to the BOP crisis were not introduced at the same time.
Rather, they were spread throughout the period 1983-84. It is be-
lieved that all the necessarystabilization measureswere already in
place by December 1984. This does not, however, mean that the
crisisperiod isalready over.
This study hasattempted to document andcritically evaluatethe
various stabilization measuresadopted by government in responseto
the 1983-84 BOP crisis.Specifically, it hasexamined the measures
adopted by governmentto improve the balanceof payments, to ma-
nage budget deficits and growth of reserve money, as well as the
price and wage adjustmentseffected throughout the period 1983-84.
Their effects on the overall balance Of payments, inflation, output
and employment have also been investigated.The major findingsare
summarizedbelow.
MeasuresAdopted to improve the Balanceof Payments
The immediate policy responsesof government were directed at
the external sector. To discourageimports and arrest further capital
flight, the peso was devaluedthree times between June 1983 and
june 1984. Finally, a free float was declaredin October 1984.
The adjustments in the exchange rate were accompanied by
severeforeign exchangerestrictionsand wide rangingimport controls
which include, amongothers, the creation of a foreign exchangepool
for priority import payments by requiring banks to sell100 percent
of their foreign exchangereceiptsto the Central Bank and the setting
up of priorities in the allocation of foreign exchange. However,
towards the last quarter of i 984, the Central Bank abolishedthe for-
eign exchange priority allocations program for importsand allowed
banks to hold 30 percent of their outstanding regular letters of
credit.
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New trade taxes were also imposed,effectively raisingthe prices
of importables. Ad valorem duty on all importations was raisedby
10 percent in june 1984. In addition, a specialexcisetax of 10 per-
cent was imposedon foreign exchangesold by the Central Bank and
its agents in June 1984. This was subsequentlyreplaced by the for-
eign exchangetransactiontax of 1 percent in October 1984. The eco-
nomic stabilization tax of 30 percent was imposed on all exports in
June 1984 but waslater suspendedin September1984.
These measureshave immediate effects on the real price of for-
eign exchange.The seriesof de recto devaluationshaveraisedthe real
effective exchange rate from an index of 97.74 in 198:2to 112.90 in
1984 (1973=100). Correcting the appreciation of the dollar for the
additional import tariff and export taxes and comparingthe resulting
net effectiv_ changein the exchangerate with the changesin domes-
tic costs,representedby GDP deflator and wage index show that it
was not until June 1984, when the pesowas devaluated toT=18to a
dollar, that net advantagefor traditional and non-traditional exports
could be discerned.The lifting of the stabilization tax and the floa-
ting of the peso could have considerably improved the net effective
changein the exchangerate for both traditional and non-traditional
exports, had GDP deflator not risen more sharply, eroding some of
the benefits from net devaluation. For importabies, the net effective
change in the exchange rate has been generally favorable, implying
that producers of import substitutes have benefitted from the peso
devaluation. Overall, the recent de facto devaluations should have
favorable effectson trade balance.
Additional tariffs and export taxes have virtually reversedthe
trade liberalization processinitiated in 198,T. Interestingly,the com-
modity groups included in the CB list of priorities are alsothe ones
previously enjoying low import tariffs and priority in foreign ex-
chahgeallocations. Since foreign exchangeallocation by government
effectively acts as quantitative restrictionson imports, then the mea-
suresadopted by government in responseto the crisis givemore pro-
tection to heavily protected import substitutes while penalizing less
protected sectors(e.g., exports).
Clearly, the emergency measurestaken to managethe BOP are
contrary to the long-rungoal of rationalizing the protection structure
which would have eliminated the unjustified penaltiesagainstnon-
traditional exports and efficient import substitutes. Further, the
measures,although effective in curing balance-of-paymentsdifficult-
ies, have widened the variation of effective rate of protection that
could increasethe cost of bllancing the foreign exchangebudget in
the long-run.
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MeasuresAdopted to Managethe Budget Deficits
The efforts to manage budget deficits consistof raisinggovern-
ment revenuesand controlling the growth of expenditUres.Between
June 1983 and July 1984, the additional revenues were mainly
sourcedfrom the external sector by increasingthe specific tax On
petroleum products,tariff duties, export duties and by imposingeco-
nomic stabilization tax on exports. As the need to raisemore reven-
ues was felt, another set of revenue raising measures was put in
place between August and Oct(Jber 1984. The new measureshave
two distinguishingfeatures.One is that the additional tax burden has
been shifted from the external sector to the internal sector. The
other is that exemptions previously enjoyed by certain industriesand
some individual entities, including government corporations like Na-
tional Power Corporation_have been withdrawn. Thus, the efforts
to raiserevenuesconsist,of increasingtax ratesand widening the tax
base. The estimated revenuesfrom the new tax measuresconstitute
0.5, 1.3 and 2.7 percentof GNP in 1983, 1984 and 1985, respective-
ly.
Cash disbursementsof the national governmentfell slightly short
of the original cashdisbursement program in 1983, but they went
beyond by 21.5 percent in 1984. Actual cashdisbursementsin nomi-
nal terms increasedby 1 percent in 1983 and 28.9 percent in 1984.
Capital outlays, specifically the MPWH/MTC capital outlay and cor-
porate equity, suffered hugecutbacksin.1983 and 1984. Net lending
is a problem area in both years in terms of resistanceto cutbacks,
mainly because of pressuresfrom the financially-strapped govern:
ment corporate sector. The thirteen major non-financialgovernment
corporations posted combined deficits of @15.7B and t_12.3B in
1983 and 1984, respectively. Likewise, government financial corpo-
rations, particularly DBP, PNB and Philguaranteeincurredhugedefi-
cits, reaching_'l 2.7B in 1984.
Taken as a whole, the efforts initiated by the national govern-
ment to manage its budget deficits produced some favorable results.
Total budget deficits as a percent of GNP went down from a high
4.28 in 1982 to 1.69 and 1.58 in 1983 and1984, respectively.While
these cuts in budget deficits are impressive by international stand-
ards, the accompanying adjustment costs have however produced
some perverseredistribution effects asmay be shown later.
Responseto the Crisisin the Monetary Sector
In contrast to 1982, monetary policy during the period 1983-84
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shifted in the direction of disinflation and credit restraint. The effort
was focused mainly on reducingthe money multiplier and putting a
cap on the growth of reservemoney. Reserverequirementson depo-
sit liabilities of banks were increasedfrom 18 to 24 percent. The
Central Bank has practically closedthe subsidizedrediscountingwin-
dows since the crisisbegan. Further, by peggingthe rediscountrates
on the Manila Reference Rate, which is in turn basedon actual tran-
sactions, rediscountaccommodation has been made more an instru-
ment of short-run stabilization and lessan instrument for develop-
ment financing. The Central Bank also introduced the CB bills to
help mop up excessliquidity. Although the unprecedentedly high
ratesoffered on these bills seemedto havearrested capital outflows
that might have put pressureon the peso,they inducedhigh interest
ratesin the whole system, resultingin massivedecline in trade and in-
ventory financing. Finally, policiesto restrict the useof foreign loans
were instituted.
The high growth rate in reserve money during the period of
analyr,is seemsto indicate inflationary monetary policy. Revaluation
effects that bloated net domestic assetswere mainly responsiblefor
the massiveincrease in reserve money. It is reasonableto view the
revaluation effect as non-discretionary within the immediate crisis
period. After removingthe revaluationeffect, the net domesticassets
component of monetary base actually increasedby only 5 percent
between June 1983 and June 1984 and only 8 percent in the first
nine months of 1984. The inescapableconclusion is that in the
period when inflation exceeded 40 percent, discretionary monetary
policy has been disinflationary, especiallyon net domestic credit. It
is the distribution of the burden of adjustment of these discretion-
ary actions that is important. In this regard,the biastoward placing
a greater burden on the private financial sector becomesobvious.In
the twelve-month period between June 1983 and June 1984, net
credit to the public sector grew by 88.5 percent while that to the
financial system fell by 34.4 percent. The latter recoveredto the
December1982 level only in September1984.
The increasein net credits to the public sectortook the form of
budgetary loans and overdrafts which were resortedto in the wake
of government revenueshortfalls. On the other hand, the reduction
in net lending to deposit money banks took the form of a reduction
in rediscountingand the effect of open market operationswhen the
Central Bank issuedreverserepurchaseinstruments.
There was an increase in net lending by the Central Bank to
"other financial entities," a category that includes private thrift
banksas well as governmentspecializedbanks. But the increasewas
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mainly due to the emergency loansprovided thrift banksin response
to massivewithdrawals by depositors and the effort to keep DBP
functional.
Price andWage Adjustments
For the past decade, socializedpricing hasbeenusedextensively
in basic commodities - suchasrice, corn, chicken, eggs,sugar,etc.-
petroleum products, electricity and apartment rental. In view of the
series of de focto devaluations effected between 1983 and 1984,
prices of these commodities were adjusted upwards. For example,
support price for palay went up by 97.1 percentfrom June 1983 to
December 1984. Domestic price of petroleum products rose by
129.7 percenton the averagefor the sameperiod.
The long-standingpolicy of price control, however,was reversed
during the last quarter of 1984. As of November 1984, rice is the
only item that has remained in the PSC list of controlled commodi-
ties. In addition, subsidiesto low-income consumersare going to be
reducedgradually over a period of time. The current policy of dere-
gulation is to remove distortions that have been created by previous
price controlsand to assureefficient allocation of scarceresources.It
is expected that in the long-run, supply of basiccommoditieswill be
adequate,thereby stabilizing their prices.
The inflationary pressuresdue to the recent peso devaluations
and increasedtax rates have prompted government to adjust legisla-
ted money wages(which include basic pay and allowances)upwards
five times between June 1983 and November 1984. Between July
1983 and June 1984, increasesin legislatedmoney wageswere com-
mensurateto the increasein pricesfor the sameperiod. This develop-
ment seemsto indicate that government'swagespolicy wasdirected
towards protecting real wagesof minimum wage workers. However,
starting in july 1984, real wagesstarted to decline. This trend was
reversedin November 1984 when a new wageorder wasintroduced.
However, the increasewas not enough to compensatefor the lossin
purchasing power due to inflation since the last wage adjustment
effected in June1984. Workers not coveredby wagelegislationcould
havebeen worse off. The resultsof NEDA-SCO's Surveyof Key Ma-
nufacturing Enterprises show that the rate of increase in the com-
pensation of employees in 1984 was lessthan one-half of the infla-
tion rate for the sameyear, indicating that employeesof key enter-
prisessuffered a substantialcut in their real wages.
One related policy concern is the sufficiency of wages. When
legislatedmoney wages are compared with the National Wages
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Council's estimatesof the averagecost of daily food and other
basicnecessities,it appearsthat for a householdwithtwo minimum
wageworkers,the basicfood needscan be met but not all theother
basicneeds.
Coverageand complianceof legislatedmoney wagesare other
areasof concern. Availableinformation showsthat only 23 per-
cent of those employedin 1983 are minimum wageworkers. In
addition, violation of wageorders is observedto be prevalent,
an unfortunatesituationaggravatedby the lackof inspectionteams
from theMinistryof Laborand Employment.
A relatedconcern is the relative impactof wage legislationon
different firms. Whiletheselawsare introducedto improvethe wel-
fare of low-incomeearners,they may proveto be inequitablein the
sensethat efficientfirms, whichare not exemptedfrom, and really
follow strictly, thewageorders,are theonespenalized.
Effectsof the VariousMeasureson Balanceof Payments,
Inflation,OutputandEmployment
Althoughit istoo earlyto assessthe full effectsof thedifferent
policy measureson the overallbalanceof payments,someindica-
tions can already be gleanedfrom availableinformation. Looking
at the trade balance,someamountof successeemedto havebeen
achieved.Thedeficit in the currentaccountwasreduceddrastically
by 43.8 percentduringthe first three quartersof 1984 ascompared
to the sameperiodin 1983. This wasmainlydue to the largecut-
back in imports sinceexportsachievedonly a modestgrowthin the
sameperiod.
While traditional exportsfell, non-traditionalexportsincreased,
netting an 8.5 percentgrowth rate for the total valueof exports
during the first three quartersof 1984. A qualificationmust be
madehere,however. Electronicsand garments,whichare the main
non-traditional exports, have very low value added so that the
benefits of devaluationcould not be fully exploitedby thesein-
dustries.
Total imports,on the other hand,declinedby 20 percentfrom
the first three quartersof 1983 to the first three quartersof 1984.
As expected,importsof capitalgoodssufferedthe biggestcutback.
The cutbackon total importscould be attributed mainlyto the
exchangecontrols,the seriesof de focto devaluationsand tight
monetaryand fiscal policieswhich effectivelydampeneddemand.
The present crisishas producedan inflation problem more
severethan that causedby the oil shocksin 1974 and1978. The
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CPI started to climb in June 1983, when the peso was devalued
to 1=18 to a dollar, reaching a peak at 63.8 percent in October
1984.
Various factors have contributed to the upward'movement
of the CPI. Using an inflation model, the additional tax on petro-
leum products added 0.1 percentage point to the inflation rate
in 1983 and 4.8 percentage points in 1984. Import surcharge
had a very minimal effect on inflation rate, 0.01 percentagepoint
in 1983 and 0.47 percentage point in 1984. The increasesin the
price ceiling of basic commodities contributed 0.05 percentage
point to the 1983 inflation rate and 0.65 percentage point to the
1984 inflation rate. The S-step adjustmentsin the pricesof petro-
leum products since June 1983 resulted in an additional increase
of 1.46 percentage points in the 1983 inflation rate and 13.61
percentage points in the 1984 inflation rate. The seriesof wage
adjustments since June 1983 contributed 0.47 percentagepoint to
the increase in the 1983 inflation rate and 3.75 percentagepoints
in the 1984 inflation rate.
The credit crunch sent interest rates up high, especially in 1984
when the Central Bank introduced the high yielding CB bills. The
91-day Treasury bill rate (which was used as a proxy for all the
rates) added 1.04 percentagepoints to the 1983 inflation rate and
7.81 percentagepoints to the 1984 inflation rate. Total liquidity
contributed 0.19 percentage point to the 1983 inflation rate and
6.66 percentagepoints to the 1984 inflation rate. Among the expla-
natory variables in the inflation model, total liquidity obtains the
highestIong-runelasticityof 0.76.
As discussedabove, both fiscal and monetary policiesgenerally
tended to be deflationary, especially towards the second half of
1984. This development has certainly produced unfavorable effects
on output and employment.
The agricultural sector posted negativegrowth rates starting the
second quarter of 1983 up to the first quarter of 1984. The in-
dustrial sector started to yield negative growth after the first
de facto devaluation in 1983 and has never recoveredsince then.
The servicesector suffered the same fate. While the economiesof
other ASEAN countries grew at an enviable rate in 1984, the Philip-
pine economy shrank by 4.0 percent (GDP) in the same year, given
the sameinternational environment.
The general slowdown of the economy has indeed posed a great
problem to labor absorption. The number of workers terminated
as a result of shutdown/retrenchment increased from 75,428 in
1983 to 86,186 in 1984. Massive layoffs occurred in the manufac-
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turing sector. Unemployment rate went up from 4.6 percent during
the third quarter of 1983 to 6.2 percent during the third quarter of
1984, while underemployment rate rose from 30.1 percent to
36.5 percent for the same period. The view taken in this study is
that the increase in unemployment and underemployment rates
is not the direct result of increasesin legislated money wages.
Instead, other factors, specifically lack of raw materials resulting
from import controls, tight monetary and fiscal policies and a
slump in demand, weigh more heavily in the decisionof employersto
lay off some of their workers. Since the adjustment measuresneed
some time to produce favorable effects on output and prices,sectors
heavily dependent on government expenditures and imported raw
materials as well as the labor sector will continue to feel the pain
brought about by the measures.
Several conclusionscan be drawn from the resultsof the study.
These are discussedbelow not necessarily in the order of their
importance.
1. When the crisis struck, policy measurestaken by government
became very restrictive and mostly oriented towards putting more
control on the external sector. But asthe needto obtain the standby
credit agreement with the IMF became more pressing,the govern-
ment began usingthe orthodox policy instruments,which include,
amongothers, greatercontrol of reservemoney, reduction of budget
deficits, fully flexible exchangerates, freeing of prices,reduction of
newly introduced import and tariff duties, allowing real wages to
decline, and withdrawal of tax exemptions and subsidies.The latest
packageof stabilization measureshas at least two distinguishingfea-
tures. One is that it includesmeasures suchas freeing of pricesand
d'oingaway with subsidiesthat might not havebeen introduced had
the crisis not cropped up. The other is that it has strong long-term
components,relying more on the free market system. Both features
suggestthat the government is moving towards restructuring the
economy.
2. The measuresadopted were aimed at restricting aggregate
demand to curb the rate of price increasesand reduce the balance-
of-payments deficits. So far, modest successhas been achievedwith
regard to the latter. Admittedly, direct exchangecontrols were con-
sidered a critical factor in improving the balance-of-payments
position during the period considered. But with regard to mo-
derating the inflation rate, all indications seem to show otherwise.
It should be noted that during this high inflationary period, the
government made a series of de facto devaluations and pursued
a tight monetary policy which was responsiblefor the sharp rise
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in interest rates. These can be reasonablyviewed as supply shocks
that eventually affected pricesof final output within the immediate
crisis period. In this regard, one might be tempted to claim that
the inflation is of the cost-push type, and policies restricting
demand may not be appropriate. However, the readingthat one can
get from the package of policies is that inflation seemsto be re-
garded as a symptom of the improper working of the economy.
The restructuring of the economy sought by the policy measuFes
will, in the long-run, provide a stronger economy with more stable
price movements. The presenceof "effect lag," that is, the time
that elapses between the variation of the instrument of control
and its actual effect on any one of the targets,explainswhy inflation
rate was not moderated during the time that the measureswere in-
troduced.
3. One controversial aspect of the monetary policy response
to the crisis had to do with the raising of domestic interest rates.
This policy was carried out through the role of government
securitieswhich paid high interests. The effectivenessof thisstrategy
in defendingthe exchangerate cannot be questioned. What can be
questioned is its place in the current recovery program. The policy
instrument used induced high domestic interest rates which put
at risk the survival of companies whose difficulties endangerthe
adjustment effort itself. Moreover, resourceswould not flow into
new real investmentunlessratesof return areat leastashigh asthose
prevailing in the financial markets. The old exchange rate system
and government budget deficits Wereimportant contributory factors
to the crisis. That the constraints in the removal of these sources
of trouble might havecausedfurther permanent damageduring the
recoveryperiod isa matter of concern.
4. There seemsto be some rigidity in the budget process. Speci-
fically, net lending by the government is found to be resistant to
cutbacks. This is so because the government regardsthis item as
endogenous; that is, whenever the public corporate sector incurs
some deficits, the governmentwill likely absorb them. This in effect
allows the public corporate sector to proceedwith their expenditure
program without undergoing the normal processesthat ordinary
government agenciesare subjected to whenever a budget allocation
is requested from the national government. Better management
of budget deficits, therefore, requiresfirmer control of net lending
provided to the government corporate sector. Perhaps, together
with the stabilization measures,efforts to developthe privatecapital
market might be exerted. Initial funds will have to come from the
government, perhaps using the proceeds from the sale of corpora-
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tions and the funds that might havebeen neededfor net lending,and
from the Central Bank. Once instituted, government corporations,
under a policy of self-financing, may be required to borrow from the
capital market to finance their requirements, instead of going to
the government. This program will achievethree objectives. First,
it will help develop the moribund capital market. Second, it will
force government corporations to be efficient to be able to com-
pete with the private sector. Third, it will give government greater
control over its budget since the net lending item will virtually
disappearfrom itsbudget program.
5. It is to be noted that the stabilization measureshave a pro-
found effect on output and employment. Although in the long run
they promise high sustainedgrowth in output and greater employ-
ment, in the short-run however, the economy has to content itself
with reduced output and employment. Indeed, the distributive
effects of reduced output and employment are very unsettling
issues.
The seriesof de facto devaluations and the eventual freeing of
the foreign exchange market have certainly improved the relative
price of tradables vis-a-vis non-tradables,thus favoring the export
sector and the import-substituting activities. However, during the
period of tight exchange controls, the measuresadopted were such
that the heavily protected import-substituting activities got more
protection while the export sector was penalized even more. Thus,
even between the two economic activities, distributive effects of
exchange rate adjustments were uneven in view of the various ex-
changecontrols.
The imposition of additional import tariffs and export duties
has certainly shifted resourcesto thegovernment sector. While
the additional import tariffs and duties were subsequently reduced
towards the last quarter of 1984, still the amount that went to
the government in absolute terms was substantial in view of the
exchange rate adjustments. To the extent that government has a
very low savings propensity, the shift of resourcestowards the
government sectorcould be inflationary.
The discretionary actions of the monetary authorities were
disinflationary during the crisisperiod. However, monetary policies
seem to have been directed at maintaining failing government cor-
porations (suchas DBP) and making up for the suddenrevenueshort-
falls of the government. Indeed the massiveincreasein lending to
the public sector and to government financial institutions during
the same period required an equally massivewithdrawal of credit
to the private sector. There is no doubt that this credit withdrawal
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reduced domestic spending, a goal of the stabilization program.
The question of whether this reduction should have been borne
more by the governmentcan however be raised. Were the purposes
to which government applied the credit truly crucial? If the credit
went to non-productive or non-viableprojects, then monetary policy
could have further led to a reduction in output and employment
than it otherwisewould havebeen.
The way in which budget deficits are reduced determines to a
largeextent the distributive effects of fiscal adjustmentsintroduced
during the crisis period. The government opted to increase tax
revenuesand moderate the growth of expendituresto reducebudget
deficits. To increase tax revenues, the government increasedthe
tax ratesand broadened the tax base.The distribution of the burden
of- the new tax measuresindeed raisesgreat concern. The observed
pattern of changesin the specific tax on petroleum productsseems
to indicate that low income earnersare penalized more heavily than
highincome earners.The withdrawal of tax exemptionsand subsidies
from utilities have also regressivedistributive effects. Thus, the in-
crease in taxes, together with the inflation tax, definitely hurts the
low incomeearners.
The way in which government disposesits funds hasalso distri-
butive effects. The government opted to reduce capital outlays,
particularly public investment in infrastructure. This added more
unemployment, mostly among unskilled and semi-skilled workers,
since this sector is labor-intensive.On the other hand, the govern-
ment increased net lending. This benefitted the government cor-
porate sector which is relatively more capital-intensive. Thus, the
expenditure pattern of government also tends to have regressive
distributiveeffects.
One final conclusion that can be drawn from the resultsof the
study is that the crisis has occasionedthe huge shift of real and
financial resourcestowards the government sector. Both monetary
and fiscal policies adopted=havefacilitated such shift. This develop-
ment has definitely made the size of the government sector in the
economy even bigger. However, consistency with the long-run
bias of the stabilization measuresrequires a smaller public sector
relative to the private sector. This meansthat the government will
eventually have to return the so-called "vital industries" and dis-
tressedcorporations recently taken over by government to the priv-
ate sector. But divestment of these assetswould not bean easy task
during this period. In fact, the government is caught in a real
dilemma. By taking over capital-intensive industriesand by infusing
additional capital to rehabilitate distressedcorporations, the govern-
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ment has in effect increasedthe.value of thesefirms. Indeed, the
size of the capital alone can serve as an effective deterrent for the
financially-starved private sector to buy back the said corporations.
This is further complicated by the prevailing high interest rates on
borrowed funds which would make re-acquisitionof those corpora-
tions unnecessarilyexpensive. Unless these corporations will be
grossly undervalued, the private sector will not be attracted to buy
back these corporations. This, of course, would result in huge
lossesfor the government,a developmenthardly acceptablein view
of the current efforts to streamlinegovernment'sbudgetdeficits.
xxvii
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
The 1983-84 balance-of-paymentscrisis has, thus far, been the
worst in Philippine post-war history. Forced to make do with
severely limited foreign exchange,vital both for consumption and
industry, the economy suffered a negative GDP growth rate of 4
percent in 1984, record high inflation rates in the order of 50
percent and massive unemployment. Although few people doubt
that the Philippines will survive the crisis,there are differing views
regardinghow a real recoverycould be achievedand when. In the
meantime, the government has had to initiate emergency measures
to alleviate the effects of the crisis as well as institute plans for
recovery. On the other hand, the International Monetary Fund,
representingthe Philippines'major lenders, hasbeen on the govern-
ment's heels, imposing strict requirements regarding major govern-
ment policies - most notably on exchange rate, money supply,
government expenditure and taxation. Although it may still be too
early for the full effects of these measures to become visible,
enough time has passed to discern what they possibly are. Now
is the opportune time to pause and examine how beneficial these
measureshave really been.
It is the main objective of this study to review and evaluatethe
measureswhich have been instituted by the government during the
period 1983-84 in responseto the 1983 balance-of-paymentscrisis.
It attempts to shedlight on the following questions:
1. What was the rationale for the institution of specific
measures?
2. How consistent were these measures with one another?
With long-rungrowth objectives?
3. What are the likely impactsof these measureson output,
employment and prices?
4. Who bearsthe burdenof adjustments?
The study does not claim to be comprehensive nor strictly
rigorous. The availability of recent and pertinent data imposes
a severelimitation.
The next chapter of this study provides a brief background
on the Philippine economic performance during the period 1975-
1989. This aims to help in understandingthe context of the various
policy measures. Chapter III gives an overview of government res-
ponse to the economiccrisis. Chapters IV and V contain the body
of study. Chapter IV givesa critical analysisof the policy measures
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in the $ major areas- (a) balance-of-paymentsmanagement,(b)
budget deficit management,(c) monetary policy, (d) price adjust-
ments, and (e) wage adjustments. ChapterV then attempts to
examine the effectsof thesemeasureson (a) balance-of-payments,
(b) inflation, and(c) output andemployment.
Chapter II
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 1975-82
This chapter briefly reviews the major economic developments
that took place during the period 1975-82. Hopefully, this will
lead to a better understandingof the measuresadopted by govern-
ment authorities in responseto the 1983-84 BOP crisis. A more
detailed analysisof the balanced)f-paymentsdifficulties experienced
by the Philippines can be found in Pante (1983), Power (1983),
Remolona, Mangahasand Pante (1984), and Intal (1984).
Table I1.1 presentsselected economic indicators for the Philip-
pines from 1975 to 1982. The economy was characterized by
persistent and increasing current account deficits, rising from
US$892M in 1975 to a high US$3,200M in 1982. A significant
contributory factor to the current account imbalance was the rapid
deterioration in the terms of trade. The net terms of trade index
fell from 100 in 1972 to 58.7 in 1982. Demand for exports also
slowed down considerablyduring the same period, especially after
the second oil shock when most maior trading partners underwent
a prolonged recessionaryperiod. Power (1983) estimatedthat during
the period 1973-82 about 78 percent of the total external shockscan
be attributed to the deterioration in the terms of trade and the re-
maining,to the effects of world recession.
Since net inflow of direct foreign investmentswas very minimal
during the period, the current account deficits were financed mainly
by foreign borrowings. External debt outstanding increasedfrom
US$3,799M in 1975 to a staggeringI_vel of US$17,469M in 1982.
As a share of GNP, total external debt outstanding converted into
pesos rose from 24.1 percent in 1975 to 47.7 percent in 1982.
During the period 1975-80, total external debtswere almost equally
shared by the private sector and the public sector, but the latter's
share increaseddramatically to 58 percent in 1981 and stayed at
57 percent in 1982.
The relatively favorable conditions in the international financial
markets after the first oil shock madethe useof external borrowings
possibleto cushion the impact of current account imbalance on the
overall BOP position. With easy international credit, the share of
medium and long term loans rose from 78 percent in 1975 to 84.6
percent in 1977, and stayed above 80 percent until 1979. Govern-
ment authorities took this opportunity to beef up international re-
serves. But after the second oil shock, OECD countriespursueda
tight monetary policy. This dried up the Ioanable funds in the
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international market, pushed interest rates upwards and shortened
the period for loan maturity. This hasa perceptible effect on the
external debts outstanding of the Philippines. The shareof medium
and long term loans in total external debts went down to 74.5
percent in 1982 as the share of short term loans went up to 25.5
percent in the same year. The growing share of short term loans
together with the sharp increasein the interest rate further aggra-
vated the BOPproblems in the later years.
The chronic current account deficits since 1974 clearly called
for prudent management of both the external and internal sectors.
Apparently, this was not pursuedby government authorities. Adjust-
ment of the nominal exchange rate allowed by the Central Bank
was very minimal during the period despite adverse developments
in the current account balance and acceleratingdomestic inflation
rate. This can be gleaned from the moderate increasein the official
effective exchange rate inde× from 100 in 1973 to 115.68 in 1982.
With the Philippines experiencing a higher inflation rate than its
major trading partners, the real effective rate index consequently
went down to 87.74 in the same period, indicating a real apprecia-
tion of the peso. The overvalued domestic currency definitely en-
couragedimports and discouragedexports.
Rather than pursuinga deflationary policy to correct the chronic
current account imbalance, government authorities opted for a
fiscal and monetary expansionary posture. The acceleration of
the investment rate, combined with a sluggishgrowth in the savings
ratio, which was partly due to the unfavorable interest rate policy
and cheap rediscounting policy of the Central Bank, further widened
the savings-investmentgap from -7.1 percent in 1975 of GNP to -8.7
percent in 1982. Indeed, the rapid increase in government capital
expenditures during the same period contributed significantly to
the savings-investmentgap.
The national government has been running huge deficits since
1975. Interestingly, the deficit was kept below 2 percent of GNP
up to 1980. However, it shot up to 4.0 percent and 4.3 percent
in 1981 and 1982, respectively, as a result of the downward trend
in government revenues and an increasing government expenditure
program. Although national government revenues were growing
in absolute terms, they exhibited a perceptible and worrisome
downhill movement when expressed as a proportion of GNP in the
period 1975-1982 (see Tables 11.2 and 11.3). From a high 14.7
percent of GNP in 197.5, national government revenues averaged
13.4 percent of GNP in 1976-1980 and fell to an averageof 11.6
percent of GNP in 1981 and 1982. As a percentage of GNP, non-
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tax revenues were highest in 1975 at 2.7 percent, averagedat 1.9
percent in 1976-1980, and averaged at 1.4 percent in 1981-1982.
Tax revenues, again in proportion to GNP, were at their best at 12
percent in 1975, averaged 11.5 percent in 1976-1980, and dipped
to an all-time low of 10.0 percent in 1982. The decline in the tax
to GNP ratio in 1981-82 was partly due to the implementation of the
Tariff Reform Program in those years. However, a greater pro-
portion of the revenue short fall could be attributed to factors
that are not relatedto the said program. 1/
On the other hand, national government expenditures as a
proportion of GNP were fairly stable in 1975-1978, averaging 15.2
percent, dipped to 13.7 percent in 1979, consistently-rose to 14.4
percent in 1980, 15.8 percent in 1981 and levelled at 15.6 percent in
1982. Current operating expenditures as a percentageof GNP were
fairly stable at 11.6 percent averagefor 1975-1978 and 9.2 percent
average'for 1979-1982. Their share in total expenditures was75.1
percent in 1975, peaked at 77.7 percent in 1976-1977 and contin-
uously dropped to 58.9 percent in 1982. Capital outlays grew from
an average rate of 3.4 percent of GNP (3.8 percent of GNP if net
lending is included) in 1975-1979 to an average rate of 4.9 percent
of GNP (5.2 percent if net lending is included) in 1980, and to an
average of 6.3 percent of GNP (6.8 percent with net lending) in
1981 and 1982.
The share of the traditional infrastructure sectors (MPWH/
MTC) in total capital outlay inclusive of net lending averaged48
percent in 1975-19.78,48.6 percent in 1979-1981, and declined
dramatically to 34.8 percent in 1982. Other capital outlays in-
creased their share from an average of 5.9 percent in 1975-1979
to 27 percent in 1982. Corporate equity plus net lending captured
an average of 41.8 percent of total capital outlays for 1975-1982
with itspeak at 53.5 percent in 1982.
Three major trends then stand out in the national government's
cash budget between 1975-i982. First, government revenues as
a percentageof GNP followed a downward movement. Second, this
was accompanied by a corresponding decline in current operating
expenditures relative to GNP so that the national government's
surplus on current operations as a percentageof GNP was relative-
ly stable during the period. Third, capital outlays consistently
grew relative to GNP after 1975.
l_The/ buoyancy of taxes and tariffs on imports with respect to GNP is estimated to
be 0.85 while that of all other taxes lumped together is 1.10 in 1975-1980. If these para-
meters based on historical data were carried forward to 1981 then the revenue short fall for
tariffs and taxes on imports is _"1,539M while that for all other taxes is P2,949 M.
National government expenditures, on an obligation basis,
averaged 15.3 percent of GNP in 1975-1982 (lowest in 1980 at
13.9 percent of GNP and highest in 1976 at 16.8 percent of GNP).
Current operating expenditures were 10.1 percent of GNP on the
average in 1975-1978, and was 9 percent of GNP on the average
in 1979-1982. In terms of total expenditures, current operating
expenditures accounted for 62.4 percent in the period (lowest
in 19.75 and 1981 at 55 percent and highest in 1976 at 67;6 per-
cent). Capital outlays averaged5.4 percent of GNP in 1975-1982.
The highest recorded were in 1975 and 1981 with 7.2 and 6.4
percent of GNP, respectively. The years 1977, 1978, 1980 and
1982 were low in government investment with lessthan 5 percent
of GNP going to capital outlays. The shareof MPWH/MTC in total
capital outlays was 48 percent in 1975-1980 but went down to 32.6
percent in 1981-1982. About 35 percent of capital outlays was
allocated to corporate equity contribution in 1975-1980. In 1981
and 1982, its share rose to 54.5 percent.
The government corporate sector experienced tremendous
growth in numbers in the last decade particularly in the early 1980s
when the government, through its various instrumentalities, under-
took the rescue of several distressed corporations. Public cor-
porations in the Philippines, however, are not financially self-suf-
ficient. In 1981, the deficit of the 13 major non-financial govern-
ment corporations stood at _13.5B which is 4.5 percent of GNP
(see Annex I for the list). NPC accounted for 37.9 percent of this
figure followed by PNOC with 23.8 percent. NIA and NDC had
an 8.9 percent share each. This was trimmed down to I_11.1B
(or 3.3 percent of GNP) in 1982. NPC again had the biggestdeficit,
48.6 percent of the total. NDC deficit constituted 16.4 percent while
NIA had 13.3 percent of the total. These deficits exerted pressures
on the national government budget as reflected in the transfers and
contribution of the national government to the public corporate sec-
tor. In 1981 the sum total of national government transfers to
government corporations amounted to-P9.4B which represents3.1
percent of GNP and 19.5 percent of the former's total cash disburse-
ments. This took any one of three forms: equity contributions, sub-
sidies or net lending. National government contributions to govern-
ment corporations increased by 37.3 percent nominally in 1982
reaching_P12.9B (3.8 percent of GNP and 24.5 percent of the natio-
nal government's total cashdisbursements).
Partly pressured to finance government's budget deficits, the
monetary authorities also pursuedan expansionary monetary policy.
Annual total liquidity (M3) growth rates averaged 18.7 percent
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during the period 1975-82 (seeTable I1.1). Except for 1979, the dif-
ference between M3 growth rate and real GNP growth rate exceeded
10 percent each year during the same period, indicating more
pressure on prices coming from excessive monetary expansion.
Money supply (M1) growth rate even went beyond the statutory
annual growth rate of 15 percent in three occasions, i.e., 1976,
1977 and 1980. It went down to 3.5 percent and 0.8 percent in
1981 and 1982, respectively, as a result of the depressedexternal
sectordevelopments.
These major economic developments have a profound effect
on the labor sector. The prdbl_m of maintaining a decent wage
for workers and at the sametime keeping a manageable unemploy-
ment rate became more difficult, especially in an economy with
surplus labor. The authorities instituted minimum wages for four
labor sectors in the economy (seeTable I1.1). Thesewere periodical-
ly adjusted in accordance with movements of the generalprice level.
However, it is not clear how the minimum wage rate is obtained;
that is, whether it is basedon the daily nutritional requirementsof a
certain family size or on something else. Further, it is not clear at
all whether government authorities want to effect a real increase
in the minimum wage rate or maintain a certain real minimum wage
rate whenever an adjustment is made. As may be observed, real
minimum wage rates were increasing-during the period 1978-80,
but startedto declinesteadily in 1981 and 1982.
The historical unemployment rate was relatively low, averaging
4.5 percent during the period 1975-82. But this concealsthe greater
problem confronting the labor sector. Underemployment rate has
been admittedly high, posting 20 to 29 percent between 1975
and 1981 and reaching33.1 percent in 1982.
The analysis above has shown that the balance of payments
crisis currently experienced by the Philippines already took shape
a long time ago until it became clearly unmanageablein the recent
period. Deterioration in the terms of trade, unfavorable exchange
rate policy, and the expansionary monetary and fiscal policies were
among the main contributory factors to the current balance of pay-
ments crisis. The subsequentchapters will discussgovernment's res-
ponses to the BOP crisis during the period 1983-84. Their impact
on balance of payments position, prices, output and employment
will also beanalyzed.
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Chapter III
OVERVIEW OF GOVERNMENT_ RESPONSE TO
THE 1983-84 BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS CRISIS
Given the major economic developments during the period
1975-82, it was not entirely surprising that when international
banks ceased further lending to the Philippines and called their
maturing loans in the second half of 1983, the Philippineswas pro-
pelled into its worst balance_of-payments crisis in its post war
history. Suddenly faced with a severeforeign exchangeconstraint,
the Philippines had to drastically cut back its imports which were
mostly intermediate and capital goods. Preciousforeign exchange
earnings from exports were allocated mainly for interest payments
and crude o[I imports. With the economy unable to pay for its
much needed imports, production fell, shortagesresulted, massive
lay-offs occurred and inflation soared to record high levels.
Drastically reduced real income, high inflation rate and high unem-
ployment rate are ultimately the manifestations of the crisiswhich
the government had, and still has to deal with. From these key
problem areas stemmed most of the government policy responses.
The efforts focus on reducingthe BOPdeficit. As an immediate
measure, severe foreign exchange restrictions and other controls
were imposed. Foreign exchangewas strictly allocated resulting in
wide ranging prohibition of imports deemed unnecessary by
government. To further discourageimportsand capital flight and to
bring the foreign exchange price at a more realistic level, the peso
was adjusted upwards first on 23 June 1983 from I_10 per dollar
to Pll per dollar, then on 5 October 1983 to P14 per dollar, then
on 6 June 1984 to P18 per dollar. Finally, a floating rate policy
was declared in October 1984 to fully reflect supply and demand
conditions in the market. Additional ad valorem import duty was
raised from 3 percent to 5 percent in November 1983, then to 8
percent in April 1984 and finally to 10 percent on 6 June 1984.
The obiective was both to discourageimports and raise revenues.
The government allowed "no-dollar" importations for commo-
dities not ihcluded in the priority list. Under the "no-dollar" im-
portation scheme, payments for imports of thesecommodities had
to be sourced instead from the curb market. In effect, a multiple
exchange rate system was established.
The 1_18 to a dollar devaluation was accompanied by a 30
percent windfall tax on all exports (except for semi-conductors
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and exports bonded warehouses)and a 10 percent excise tax on
non-merchandisesaleof foreign exchange. Furthermore,additional
export taxes were imposed. The windfall tax and the 10 percent
excise tax were, however, suspendedlast September 1984. The
10 percent ad valorem import duty was also recently reducedto
5 percent for crudeoil imports and for all imports effective 1January
1985. Other various CB circulars to managethe BOPwereeffected.
One of the most important is the requirementby CB on the amount
of foreign exchangethat can be held by banks. The CB circular
issued in November 1983 required banks to sell 100 percent of
their foreign exchange receipts to the Central Bank. The latest
circular allows banks to hold, in addition to 100 percentof the value
of their cash letters of credit 100 percentof export bills purchased,
30 percent of outstanding regular letters of credit inclusive of cash
letters of credits, and 10 percentof foreign exchangereceiptsbased
on the two-month moving averageof the immediately preceding
12 months.
Besides devaluation, the orthodox prescription for chronic
balance of payment deficits is to pursue a program of fiscal and
monetary restraint. According to the traditional theory, con-
tractionary fiscal and monetary policies are necessaryto counteract
the expansionary/inflationary effects of devaluation.
To reduce the budget deficit, severalmeasureswere passedto
raise revenues. These included raising export taxes and additional
ad valorem import duties, and increasing taxes particularly on
petroleum. Several other specific taxes, e.g. on liquor, cigarettes,
etc. were increased. On the other hand, the proposedbudget for
1984 to 1985 intended to reduce government expenditures, par-
ticularly capital outlays.
The set of rules and regulation promulgated in the areaof mo-
netary policy since June 1983 was directed mainly on reserve
requirements and rediscounting facilitieS. Reserve requirement
was increasedby 1 percentagepoint eachin Septemberand October
1983, 1.5 percentagepoints each in Novemberand December1983.
Another one percentagepoint increaseeffective 25 April 1984
was imposed the following year. The reserverequirement on
deposit and deposit substitutes increasedfrom 18 to 24 percent.
The reserve requirement on margin deposit on import letters of
credit was increasedfrom 50 percent to 100 percent in November
1983. Rediscountingwindows, On the other hand, were virtually
closed. Insteadof quoting fixed discount rates, the Central Bank
pegged these discounts on the 90 day Manila Reference Rate
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(MRR90). The effective interest that is charged is MRR90 minus
3 to 9 Percentage points depending on the nature of the paper.
High inflation rate is one of the major problems attendant to
the crisis. The inflation problem has been more severe than the
effects of the 1974 and 1978 oil shocks. The Consumer Price
Index (CPI) started to climb in June 1983, reaching double digit
year-on-year inflation rate by October of the same year. It still
continued to increase rapidly so that by August 1984, the inflation
rate has gone up to 60.4 percent. Price controls were used to
mitigate somewhat the inflation effect. However, direct price con-
trois cannot be resorted to indefinitely without seriously distorting
the market system. Price ceilings of PSC-covered commodities
increased on 15 occasions since June 1983.
To protect workers against erosion of their incomes due to
inflation, six wage orders have been implemented since June 1983.
The sufficiency of wage adjustments and their possible inflationary
effects are two important questions which need to be examined.
Annex II summarizes in chronological order and by policy
area the main government policy responsesto the crisis.
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Chapter IV
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS MEASURES
This chapter critically evaluatesthe variousstabilization measures
adopted by government during the period 1983-84 in response to
the balance-of-payments difficulties. It is firmly believed that most
of the necessarymeasureswere already in place by December 1984,
hence the choicefor the cut-off period.
This chapter consistsof five major sections. The first section
discussesthe measuresadopted to improve the balance of payments;
the second, the measuresadopted to manage the budget deficits;
the third, the responsesin the monetary sector; the fourth, the price
adjustments; and the last, the wageadjustments effected during the
period 1983-84.
IV.1 MEASURES ADOPTED TO IMPROVE THE BALANCE
OF PAYMENTS
A. The Measures
Cognizant of the deteriorating balance of payments, the Central
Bank (CB) allowed the peso to gradually depreciate starting january
1983. This development led to strong speculations on the exchange
rate which largely contributed to the huge capital flight. To dis-
courage further speculation and, at the same time, to encourage
exports and curb imports, the Central Bank depreciated the peso
more sharply on 23 June 1983 by 7.8 percent, l_11 to $1. The
avowed policy of the government then was to defend this exchange
rate. However, unfavorable developments in the balance of pay-
ments, the continued strength of the US dollar and the rapid erosion
of international reserves in the succeeding months prodded the
CB to further depreciate the peso. The second sharp adjustment in
the exchange rate occurred on 5 October 1983, I_14 to $1 and
the third on 6 June 1984, ff18 to $1. Finally, a free float was de-
clared in October 1984.
The adjustments of the exchange rate were accompanied by a
number of exchange controls, the purposes of which were to dis-
courage imports and to assurethe optimum useof the dwindling
foreign exchange reserves. Among the notable exchange controls
were those found in CB Circular No. 970, dated 4 November 1983
(see Annex II). In particular, the circular:(1) created a foreign
exchange pool for priority import payments by requiring all banks
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to sell 100 percent of their foreign exchange receipts (this was
revised on 6 June 1984 under CB Circular No. 1010 allowing banks
to hold 20 per_cent of their foreign exchange receipts); (2) set
priorities in the allocation of foreign exchange to the following:
(a) crude oil imports, (b) raw materials, supplies, and other inputs
of export products, (c) essential grain imports, and (d) raw materials
of vital domestic industries; and (3) set ceilings for payments and
new import letters of credit. However, import licenses were re-
quired to import these goods. It may be said that the foreign
exchange controls actually acted as quantitative restrictions on
imports.
Furthermore, the priority system for foreign exchange allocation
together with the"no dollar" importation scheme for other imports
not included in the priority list created a multiple exchange rate
system. Imports included in the priority list obtained foreign
exchange at the official rate, while other imports were financed
from the black market at a higher rate (seeTable IV.1 ).
On 15 October 1984, CB abolished the foreign exchange priority
allocation program for imports. Furthermore, under CB Circular
No. 1034 dated 10 December 1984, CB has increased the amount
of foreign exchange commercial banks may hold to 30 percent
of their outstanding regular letters of credit.
To help these measures further reduce importations, new trade
taxes were imposed. An additional ad valorem duty on all importa-
tions was raised from 3 percent to5 percent on 3 November 1983,
to 8 percent on 29 April 1984, and finally to 10 percent on 6 june
1984. 1/In addition, a special excise tax of 10 percent was imposed
of foreign exchange sold by CB and its agents on 6 June 1984.
This was subsequently replaced by the foreign exchange transaction
tax of 1 percent on 15 October 1984. The required reserve on
margin deposits on import letters of credit (L/Cs) for banned items
was likewise increased to 100 percent on 2 November 1983.
To redistribute gains generated by adjustments in the exchange
rate in the export sector, additional export duties on traditional
export products and on certain non-traditional products were im-
posed starting 3 November 1984. Earlier, on 6 June 1984, an
economic stabilization tax of 30 percent was imposed on all exports
in addition to existing export duties. However, this was suspended
on 22 September 1984.
I/Exempted are those importations of government agencies with existing obligations
requiring exemptions of the diplomatic corps, personal effects of returning Filipino dip-
lomats, those of bonded manufacturing and bonded smelting warehouses.
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TABLE IV.I
BLACKMARKET (BM) TO OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE (OER) RATIO,
MONTHLY 1983-1984
PERIOD BM/OER
1983
Jan. 1.001
Feb. 1.027
Mar. 1.074
April 1.046
May 1.027
June 1.070
July 1,009
Aug. 1.095
Sept. 1.168
Oct. 1.111
Nov. 1.345
Dec. 1.350
1984
Jan. 1.484
Feb. 1.262
Mar. 1.094
April 1.277
May 1,370
June 1.195
July 1.092
Aug. 1.082
Sept. 1.077
Oct. .999
Nov. .967
Dec. .984
Sources:
BlackmarketRate: (H0ngkongBanknoteRate)
Far EasternEconomicReview
Official Rate: CentralBank
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B. Effects of the Measureson the Real Price of Foreign Exchange
and on the Structure of Protection
After discussingthe measuresadopted by government to improve
the balance of payments, it is now worthy to examine the immediate
effects of these measureson the real.price of foreign exchange and
on the structure of protection. Their effects on the trade balance
will be discussed in a later chapter.
1. The Real Price of ForeignExchange
Even with a 50 percent average annual inflation rate, the
recent devaluations have effectively raised the real (composite)
exchange rate from an index of 100 in 1973 (even falling to
as tow as 85.84 in 1979) to 112.9 in 1984 (see Table IV.2).
This means that domestic product in terms of prices are now
relatively more attractive than foreign products, thus, benefitting
exportables and import substitutes. The net effect of devalua-
tion should therefore be favorable on the trade balance. Indeed,
recent data support this (see Section 1 of Chapter V).
However, additional import tariff and export taxes were
also imposed during the period when a series of de facto devalua-
tions were effected. Increases in import tariff and export taxes
somewhat reduced the effect of devaluation on prices received
by producers of exports and import substitutes. In Table IV.3,
the nominal and net appreciation of the dollar is computed
out of the changes in import tariffs and export taxes to get
the net effective change in the exchange rate for the following
specific commodity groups: traditional exports, non-traditional
exports, and importables. This gives the combined effects of
tariff and tax changes and devaluation on prices received by
producers of the specific commodity groups. The net effective
change in the specific exchange rate are then compared with the
change in CPI index or GDP deflator and wage index to see how
much of the gains from the "net" devaluation is eroded by
changes in domestic costs (as indicated by GDP deflator and
wage index).
For traditional exports, it was not until June 1984, when
the peso was devalued to P18 per dollar, that net advantage
for traditional exporters could be discerned. There was a 50.9
percent net effective change in exchange rate for traditional
exports, as compared to a GDP deflatorchange of 46.7 percent
and 23.4 percent change in compensation rate index. Non-
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Table IV.2
NOMINAL AND REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES:
PHILIPPINES, 1970-1984
(1973= loo)
z i, ir
Year Nominal Effective Real Effective
ExchangeRate Index ExchangeRate Index
1970 85.94 98.89
1971 92.44 103.64
1972 97.09 107.18
1973 100.00 100.00
1974 99.82 83.79
1975 104.87 92.34
1976 103.48 89.03
1977 101.68 86.86
1978 103.60 88,31
1979 105.46 85.84
1980 109.31 87.16
1981 111.05 87.17
1982 115.68 87.74
1983 145.95 92.66
1984" 196.20" 96.85"
229.88** 112.90**
* Using the exchange ratesdata for 2nd quarter of 1984 and assuminga 50,%
change in Philippine GDP deflator and a 5,%change in the GDP deflator of
US, Australia, Japan, France,Germany, Canada,United Kingdom.
** Usingthe exchangerates dataasof August 23, 1984.
Source:OECD Quarterly National Accounts, No. I, March 1984. International
Financial Statistics, August 1984.
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traditional exports fared only slightly better with a net effective
change in the exchange rate of 52.6 percent. Those exempted
from the stabilization tax gainedmost with 81.6 percent change.
By September 1984, the 30 percent stabilization tax was
suspendedfor all exports and the pesowas allowed to "float,"
yielding a 79.5 percent net effective change in exchange rate
for traditional exports and 81.6 percent change for non-tradi-
tional exports. Simultaneously, however, there was a rise in
the GDP deflator (and CPI index) amounting to a total change
(for the same period - June 1983 to October 1984) of 68.2
percent, thus again almost eroding the benefits from "net"
devaluation.
For importables, the net effective change in the exchange
rate is most .favorable up to June 1984. This development is
clearly beneficial to producers of import substitutes.2/ The
figure went down slightly from 93.6 percent in June 1984
to 86.3 percent in October 1984 when the peso was allowed
to "float" and the gap between the blackmarket and the official
exchangerate narrowed down significantly.
In sum, the rise in domestic costs does not totally negate
the effects of net devaluation. The recent devaluations, net of
changes in import tariffs andexport taxes after considering the
rise in domestic costs,shouldhave a favorable effect on the trade
balance. The tight monetary and fiscal policies further rein-
forced this favorable effect on BOP.
2. Effects on Incentive/Protection Structure
Norma Tan's (1979) study on the structure of protection for
1984 shows effective protection rates (EPRs) greatly varying
across sectors from 49 to 200 percent. In particular, the results
of the study show a structure of protection heavily favoring the
manufacturing sector with an EPR index of 489 as against that
of agricultureequal to 100 (seeTable IV.4). Within the manufac-
turing sector, the final consumption products were heavily favor-
ed with an EPR index of 481 versus100 for inpUtsto construe-
tion. The export sector is heavily penalizedwith an EPR index of
100 as compared to a very high EPR index of 1525 for non-ex-
portables.
2/Considering that during the period very restrictive and discriminatory (against final
consumer products in general) exchange controls w_re in effect, 93.6 percent is probably
an underestimate although the blackmarket rate was used in our computation.
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TableIV.4
STRUCTURE OF PROTECTION, PHILIPPINES
Sector EPR Index
Agriculture and primary 100
Manufacturing 489
All sectors 400
i r
Manufacturing 275
' ' Intermediate 144
Capital 112
Inputsinto Construction 100
Consumption 481
Exportables 100
Non-exportables 1,525
All sectors 900
Source: Norma Tan, The Structure of Protection end Resource Flows #1 the
Philippines (1979).
Table IV.5
AVERAGE EPRsACCORDING TO MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUP:
1974 AND POST.TRP
(In Percent)
EPR
industry Group 1974 Post-TRP
Agriculture and Primary 9 3
Manufacturing 44 36
Exports 4 12
Non-exportables 61 -
Import, competing 37 35
Import, non-competing 148 67
Over all Average 36 28
Source: Tariff Commission.Status Report on the.Recalculation.and Analysis of
EPRs Using 1979 #0 Table(198zi).
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In 1981, a tariff reform program (TRP) was instituted. Very
high import tariffs were scheduled to be gradually reduced, while
some very low tariffs were increased to eventually reach a more
uniform tariff level. Furthermore, quantitative restrictions were
gradually lifted. The Tariff Commission calculated the EPR using
post-TRP (Tariff Reform Program) tariff rates. The results show
that the average EPR went down from 36 percent to 28 percent
(see Table IV.5). However, there is no significant change in the
rankings of the sector according to the level of protection re-
ceived, i.e., the structure of protection remains relatively the
same even after the TRP. The average EPR for agriculture and
primary sector is still much lower than the average EPR for ma-
nufacturing. Furthermore, the exports sector is still relatively
being penalized by the protection structure adopted.
The purpose of the Tariff Reform Program (TRP) is to event-
ually reach a more uniform tariff system (in the rangeof 20 to
30 percent). This would narrow down the EPR variation across
industries and thus substantially eliminate inefficiencies from
allocative biasesof a highly uneven EPR structure. Hence, tariffs,
which would be applied uniformly, would mainly be for revenue
purposes and could even be justified on terms-of-trade grounds.
The reform of the t_riff system should, of course, be accom-
panied by liberalization of imports licensing and other exchange
controls. (Exchange controls have differential tariff effects with-
out the government revenue.)
In responseto the BOP crisis, the trade liberalization efforts
initiated in 1981 were suspended.As mentioned above, additio-
nal tariffs and export taxes were imposed. Furthermore, foreign
exchange was brought under stricter control. Only those in the
priority list may obtain foreign exchange allocation from official
sources.These emergency measureshave obvious effects on the
protection structure.
The additional ad valorem import duty is uniform for all im-
ports. 3/ The additional export taxesare specific to commodities
already subject to export taxes (except for tuna and coffee) and
the rates are all at 2 percent for logs (5 percent - from 20 per-
cent to 25 percent) and copra (3 percent - from 7 percent to 10
percent until June 1984) which are incidentally also the most
heavily taxed among exports. Foreign exchangeallocation by go-
vernment effectively acts as quantitative restrictions(Q Rs).Thus,
its effects are similar to thoseof tariff and taxes. However, the
3/See footnote 1 of this chapter for a list of exemptions.
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commodity groups included in the CB list of priorities are also
the ones previously enjoying low tariffs and easier foreign ex-
change allocations. Thus, while the structure of protection is
maintained, the EPR variation has widened. Heavily protected
import substitutesget more protection and the lessprotected
sectors(e.g. exports) are even more penalized.
In sum, the emergency measurestaken to managethe BOP
are contrary to the long-run goal of rationalizing the protection
structure, which includesthe systemof uniform tariff, liberal im-
port licensingand realprotection via tax credit or direct subsidies
• to deservingindustriesinhibited by genuinemarket failures. Such
rational protection would eliminate the unjustified penalties
against nontraditional exports and efficient import substitutes
and encouragegreater economic efficiency. Further, theseemer-
gency measureswhich widen the EPR variation, although they
can improve the balance_f-payments position in the short run,
increasethe cost of balancingthe foreign exchangebudget in the
long run. A highly uneven EPR structure induces,at the margin,
the use of resourcesto savea unit of foreign exchangemorethan
what it coststo earn a unit from exports.
IV.2 MEASURES ADOPTED TO MANAGE BUDGET DEFICITS
This section discussesthe measuresadopted by government to
manage its budget deficits. The first part of this section deals with
the revenue raising measures and the distribution of the burden of
these measures.Their effects on the general price levelwill be exam-
ined in a later section.The secondpart looks at the effects of govern-
ment measuresto cut expenditures.
A. Additional Sourcesof Government Revenue
1. The New Tax Measures
As part of the government deficit managementprogram new
tax measureswere imposedin 1983 and 1984. The one year pe-
riod ending 30 June 1984 witnessedthe introduction of the fol-
lowing tax changes: (1) an increase in the specific tax on petro-
leum products, distilled spirits, wines, liquor_ cinematographic
films and cigarettes; (2) an across,the board increase in tariff
duties; (3) an increase in export duties of selectedexport com-
modities; and (4) an economic stabilization tax on exports. The
specific tax rates on petroleum products were increased four
times (on 1 July 1983, 3 November 1983, 18 May 1984 and 7
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June 1984) during the period. The specific tax on petroleum
products expressedin pesosper liter rose by an averageof 110
percent while at the other extreme, the specific tax on fuel oil
increasedby an astounding650 percent. It wasnot only the peso
rates of tax on petroleum products that went up but also the
equivalent ad valorem rates which increased from 9.5 percent
to 10.2 percent. 4/ Thespecific tax on distilled spirits, wines,
liquor, cigarettes and cinematographic films were also increased
in November 1983. The 3 percent additional duty on imports
imposedeffective December 1982 was increasedto 5 percent On
11 November 1983, then to 8 percent on 29 April 1984 and
finally to 10 percent on 6 june 1984. Additional export duties.
rangingfrom 2 to 5 percent were imposed on traditional export
productseffective 3 November 1983 to 31 December1984. The
economic stabilization tax (a tax based on the difference bet-
ween the FOB value of exports at the prevailingexchangerate at
the date of shipment andthe FOB valueof exports at the rate of
t_14 to US$1) was imposedon 6 June 1984 at 30 percent and
will gradually be reduced by 5 percentagepoints every quarter
thereafter.
Between August and October 1984, another set of revenue
raising measures was put in place. This includes the following:
(1) an increase in the specific tax on distilled spirits, cinematog-
raphic films, saccharine and its derivative, (2) imposition of an ad
valorem tax of 20 percent on fermented liquors in addition to
the existing specific tax, (3) imposition of an ad valorem tax of
10. percent on matches in lieu of the specific tax, (4) an increase
in the percentage tax on servicesrendered by millers, proprietors
of dockyards, hotels, caterers,carriers, brokers, dealers in securi-
ties ranging from 1 to 5 percentage points, (5) an increasein the
documentary stamp tax rates on certain documents by 50 per-
cent, (6) imposition of an additional 1 percent tax on all foreign
exchange and user transactions, (7) an increase in the tax on in-
surance premiums, (8) an increase in amusement taxes and taxes
on winnings, (9) simplifications of and abolition of exemptions
from the final withholding tax on interest .income, (10) imposi-
tion of an ad valorem tax on petroleum products ranging from 7
to 25 percent ip addition to the specific tax rateswhich has been
reduced, (11) an increase in the ad valorem tax on domestic
crude oil by 11 percent, (12) an increase in specific tax on im-
ported coal and coke, (13) rationalization of customs duties on
4/The equivalent ad valorem rates include both the specific tax and the special fund
levy on petroleum products.
25
corn, coal and coke, (14) imposition of ad valorem tax on cigar-
ettes (2-4 percent) while the specific tax on the same hasbeen
increasedby 25 percent, (15) an increase in tax rateson private
motor vehicles, (16) a doubling of airport passengerterminal
fees, (17) withdrawal of all exemptions•from payment of duties,
taxes, fees, imports and other charges enjoyed by government
entities like the National PoWer Corporation, National• Food
Authority, etc., (18) withdrawal of exemptions and other pre-
ferential treatment in the.payment of duties and taxes previously
granted to private business enterprises except those registered
with the Board of Investment under BP 391, with the Export
ProcessingZone Authority, Jnder LOI 1416 (copper mining)
etc., (19) a modification of inventory valuation methodology
for corporate tax purposes, and (20) improvements in salestax
and administration. At the sametime, the economicstabilization
tax wasrescinded while the 10 percent import surchargewasre-
duced to 5 percenteffective 15 October 1984 for oil imports and
effective 1 january 1985 for non-oil imports.
2. Revenue Impact of the New Tax Measures
The estimated yield from the revenue raising measuresdis-
cussedabove are summarized in Table IV.6. The estimated reven-
ues from the new tax measuresConstitute 0.5 percent of GNP in
1983, 1.3 percent in 1984 and 2.Tpercent in 1985.
3. Distribution of the Burden of the New Tax Measures
The increasedspecific tax on petroleum products, distilled
spirits, wines, liquors, cinematographic films and cigarettes as
well as the import surchargeare indirect taxes and assuch are
regressivein nature and impose a heavier burden on the poorer
segmentsof the population. The impact of the change in the
specific tax on petroleum products on different income groups
in particular is shown in the Meta Systems study on petroleum
product pricing. This is a summary of the percentagechange in
cost of living index (CLI) of different incomegroups resulting in
a 10 percent increasein the price of eachfuel.
Table IV.7 indicates that gasoline taxes are quite progressive,
kerosene and LPG taxes are regressive,while diesel and fuel oil
taxes are relatively neutral.
Note that the change in the wholesaleprice due to the change
in the specific tax is low for gasolineat approximately 4.0 per-
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Table IV.6
REVENUE IMPACT OF THE NEW TAX MEASURES
(Million'F')
1983 1984 1985
1. Increaseifl Specific Tax on
Petroleum ProductsB_sedon
July 1983 to June 1984 Mea-
sures 90,6 753,7
2. Additional Export Duty 44.9 433.0
3. Economic Stabilization Tax 282.0
4. Additional import Duty 1,732,9 2,635.5 3,298.0
5. Increasein SpecificTax on
Alcoholic Beverages 276.0 655.0
6. Increasein Specific Tax on
Distilled Spirits 111,0
7. Imposition of Ad valorem
Tax on FermentedLiquors 100_0 1,034.0
8, Increasein PercentageTax
on Services 515,0
9. Increasein Documentary
Stamp Tax 100:0 640_0 :
10. 1 Percent Tax on Foreign
Exchange 450.0 2,900.0
11. Removal of Exemptions
on Interest income 294.0 2,014.0
12, Shifting of Some Elements
of Specific Tax to an Ad
Valorem Basison Petroleum
Products 209.0 2,131.0
13, Increasein Ad Valorem Tax
on Domestic CrudeOil 107.0 209.0
14. Increasein Specific Tax
on Imported Coal and Coke 16.0 16,0
15. Rationalizationof Customs
Dutieson Corn, Coal andCoke 31.0 36.0
16. Impositionof Ad Valorem Tax
on Cigarettesand increasein
Specific Tax on the Same 250.0 881.0
17. Increasein Tax Rateson
PrivateMotor Vehicles 45.0 457.0
18. increasein Airport Passenger
Fees 30,00 150,0
19. Withdrawal of Tax Exemptions
on Government Corporations 383.0 1,100.0
20, Withdrawal of Preferential
Tax Treatment of Certain
BusinessEnterprises 200.0 1,$90.0
21. Changein Inventory
Valuation Procedures 40.0 120.0
22. Improvement inSalesTax
Administration 100.0
T O T A L 1,868,4 6,935.2 17,857.0
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centage points but high for fuel oil, diesel, LPG and kerosene at
15.8, 11.4, 11.3 and 8.4_ percentage points, respectively. Given
these, it may be concluded that the pattern of changes in the
specific tax on petroleum products brought about by the stabili-
zation measures is actually more regressive than it otherwise
could have been.
As demonstrated earlier, the additional export duties and the
economic stabilization tax have eroded some of the gains accru-
ing to exporters following the devaluation of the domestic cur-
rency. Consequently, this is borne by the export sector.
B. Government Expenditure Cutbacks
Cash disbursements of the national government (net of debt
amortization) amounted to 953.06B in 1983 and is projected to be
_'68.40B in 1984. 5/ These figures represent 97.3 and 121.5 percent
of the original cash disbursement programs in 1983 and 1984, res-
pectively.6 /
In 1983, both current operating expenditures and capital outlays
were reduced by 3.9 percent relative to their original program.
Actual MPWH/MTC capital outlays and corporate equity were 3.5
Table IV.7
AN IMPACTOF THECHANGEIN THESPECIFICTAX ON
PETROLEUMPRODUCTSONDIFFERENTINCOMEGROUPS
LPG&
Kerosene Gasoline Diesel FuelOil
lowest income .55 .15 .21 .10
national average .40 .22 .22 .11
highest income .22 .39 .22 .13
Source:Meta Systems,"Philippine PetroleumProduct PricingStudy" (June,
1984).
5/The 1984 figure is the sum of the estimates of the actual level, first semester, and
the programmed level in the second semester.
6]Note_ however, that the original cash budget program for 1984 has been adjusted
upwards for the peso devaluations and unanticipated inflation so the 21.5 percent increase
cited above is rather illusory considering that the inflation rate for the year is predicted to
be 50 percent.
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and 9 percent higher than their corresponding programmed levels
while actual other capital outlay was 28.3 percent less than the
planned amount. However, actual net lending was 33 percent higher
than the programmed amount.
For 1984, the current operating expenditures and net lending
were both above their original program levels by 14.4 and 264.3
percent, respectively. Capital outlay was 2.4 percent less than the
planned amount. Corporate equity received the biggest cutback with
22.6 percent reduction relative to the scheduled level. MPWHIMTC
capital outlays and other capital outlays were 12 and 1 percent high-
er than their corresponding programmed levels, respectively.
In nominal terms, total cash disbursements of the national
government increased by 1 percent in 1983 and 28.9 percent in
1984. In 1983, other capital outlays grew the most with 38.2 per-
cent rate of growth while corporate equity was reduced by 38.7 per-
cent compared to their 1982 levels. Capital outlay as a whole dec-
lined by 16.8 percent while current operating expenditures increased
by 11.4 percent in 1983. For 1984, capital outlay and all its com-
ponents declined, again with corporate equity suffering the biggest
proportional cutback. However, current operating expenditures
increased by 33.7 percent while net lending grew by 280.5 percent
in 1984.
Adjusting the above figures for inflation, (12 and 50 percent in
1983 and 1984, respectively) total disbursements declined by 11
percent in 1983 and further decreased by 21 percent in 1984. In
1983, the only expenditure component that grew in real terms was
other capital outlays, while in 1984 it was net lending.
As a percentage of GNP, total disbursements declined to 13.9
percent in 1983 and 12.4 percent in 1984 from a high of 15.6 per-
cent in 1982.
The general observation is that despite efforts to reduce other
capital outlay relative to the programmed level in 1983, this expen-
diture component exhibited the highest nominal growth rate and
the only one to realize a positive real growth rate. Net lending is a
problem area in both 1983 and1984 in terms of resistance to cut-
backs, primarily because of pressures from the financially-starved
public corporate sector, particularly the government financial insti-
tutions (GFIs). In view of this,net lending is likely to continue to be
a problem in the near future as foreign creditors call on the loan
guarantees extended in the past by the national government and GFIs
and have defaults in the past with the private sector and GFIs fol-
lowing the economic crisis.
The public corporate sector continued to be financially-strapped.
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The 13 major nonfinancial corporations posted a combined deficit of
P15.7B in 1983 and P12.3B in 1984. Their deficit is expected to be
_9.5B in 1985. NPC, NIA, LP,TA, MWSS and PNOC are the top five
deficit public corporations in 1983 and !984. The government finan-
cial institutions particularly DBP, PNB, and Philguarantee also in-
curred huge deficits in these years. Their combined deficits reached
_12.7B in 1984. Again, these deficits are translated into national
government transfers despite national government efforts to trim
down its budget. In 1983, national government contributions to
government corporations were reduced by 32.3 percent nominally
from the previous year's level but still constituted 16.4 percent of
total cash disbursement of the national government and 2.3 percent
of GNP. In 1984, this figure increased by 49 percent amounting to a
total of _'13B, which was 19.4 percent of total cashdisbursement of
national government, and 2.4 percent of GNP. Net lending's share
was 70 percent or _3.1B. DBP obtained 68.6 percent or=P6.25 Bof
total net lending of the national government.
Taken as a whole, the efforts initiated by the national govern-
ment to raise additional revenues and control the growth of expendi-
tures produced some favorable results. The ratio of government
budget deficits to GNP declined from a high 4.28 in 1982 to 1.69
and 1.58 in 1983 and-1984, respectively.
While these cuts in the budget deficits are impressive by inter-
national standards, i.e., when compared with those achieved by
other countries with debt problems similar to ours, the accompany-
ing adjustment costs have however produced some perverse redistri-
butive effect. First, to reduce the budget deficit the government
raised additional revenues. The new tax measures are in general
regressive, thus, favoring high income earners relative to low income
earners (see IV. 2A.3). Second, the drastic reduction in government
infrastructure expenditure as part of the cut-back on capital out-
lays has contributed to unemployment especially to the Unskilled
and semi-skilled labor force sector. On the other hand, the increase
in net lending tends to favor the capital-intensive corporate sector.
This expenditure pattern thus has regressivetendencies.
IV.3 RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN THE MONETARY SECTOR
The set of rules and regulations promulgated in the area of
monetary policy since June 1983 can be characterized as restrictive
and deflationary. In the absence of other factors, these policies
would have reduced the money supply, increased interest rates,
and reduced domestic absorption. That these rules have not resulted
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in drastic reductions in liquidity must be attributed to actions by
the government that contradicted these rules. The combination of
tight rules and relatively loose credit to government operations
has placed a heavy burden of adjustment on the private sector.
This analysis is divided into three parts. In the first part, the test
of new monetary rules and regulations is described and analyzed.
The second part attempts to document the actual developments in
the monetary sector. The third part is a discussion of the overall
effects of these policies and their implications for economic
recovery.
A. Rules and Regulations in Response to the Crisis
The Central Bank, the Monetary Board, and the President have
responded to the exigencies of the crisis by instituting new rules
applicable to the monetary system. In contrast to 1982, monetary
policy shifted in the direction of disinflation and credit restraint.
In 1982, for example, reserve requirements were being reduced,
net credit to the public sector grew by 62 percent, and the redis-
count window provided a 10 percent increase of credits to deposit
money banks. In 1983, reserve requirements were actually made
more restrictive and the rediscount windows virtually closed.
1. ReserveRequirements
Reserve requirements were increased by 1 percentage point
each in September and October, 1.5 percentage points each in
November and December 1983 (CB Circular 961). Another
one percentage point increase effective 25 April 1984 was
imposed the following year. The reserve requirements on de-
posits and deposit substitutes increasedfrom 18 to 24 percent.
These policies effected a reduction of the money multiplier
(the M3 multiplier fell from 6.2 times in June 1983 - which was
a peak since the banking and monetary reform program started
- to 4.7 in March 1984). The reserve requirement on margin
deposits on import letters of credit (LCs) was increased from
50 percent to 100 percent (CB Circular 968 dated November
1983). The Central Bank also increasedthe interest it paid on
reserve deposits with the Central Bank from 3 to 4 percent in
June (CB Circular 1007) after attempting to rely on moral
suasion in a Circular letter dated 9 May 1984. This policy contra-
dicted earlier moves to remove interest paid on depositswith
the CB in line with interest deregulation.
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2. Rediscounting
The Central Bank has practically closedthe subsidized re-
discounting windows since the crisisbegan. Instead of quoting
fixed discount rates it started to peg these,discountson the 90
day Manila Reference Rate (MRRg0). The effective interest
that is charged is MRR 90 minus 3 to 9 percentage points (see
Table IV.8) depending on the nature of the paper. Bills on tra-
ditional exports get the lowest discount while medium and long-
term papers are charged the highest discount. (The policies
were implemented by CB Circular 991 dated January 1984,
and CB Circular 994 dated March 1984.) The innovation here
is that since the MRR is based on actual transactions, rediscount
accommodation has been made more an instrument of short-run
stabilization and less an instrument for development financing.
Tighter eligibility rules for instruments that could be discounted
were also imposed in March 1984.
3. Open Market Operations
In 1981, the Central Bank started replacirig Central Bank
Certificates of Indebtedness (CBCIs) with Treasury bills with
the latter eventually serving as primary government secul'ities in
the securities market. This trend was reversed in the second
semester of 1983 when new CBCI series were issued to help
mop up excess liquidity. But the new CBCI series were cooly
received by the public because their return was not attractive
enough in the light of prevailing high inflation rates, rising levels
of interest rate, and the rapid depreciation of the peso vis-a_-vis
the dollar. This prompted the Central Bank to introduce the
CB bills under MB Resolution No. 416 dated March 16, 1984.
Unlike the CBCIs, these CB bills (popularly known as "Jobo
bills") are short-term debt instruments and cannot be used to
satisfy the statutory reserves. CB bills are designed primarily
to attract big savers since a minimum of P0.SM for firms and
I_IM for individuals is required. Above all, the coupon rates
are flexible and highly competitive with those of other financial
instruments.
The Central Bank began to earnestly sell the CB bills in
September 1984 at about the time when the necessity of evolving
a freer exchange rate regime and reducing domestic liquidity
became inescapable. The unprecedentedly high rates offered
on the bills (40 percent on 30-60 bills in September) seemed
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TableIV.8
INTERESTRATESON REDISCOUNTFACILITIES
(In PercentperAnnum)
1982 1983. 1984
December December March
MediumandLong-TermLoans 11 MRR90-3 MRR90-3
Short-Term,GeneralPurpose 8 MRR90-6 MRR90-6
TraditionalExports 8 MRR90_6 MRR.90-6
Non-TraditionalExports 3 MRRg0_7 MRR90-9
FoodProduction 8 MRR90-8 MRR90-9
MRR90- 90-dayManilaReferenceRatio
Source:Central_flk
to have arrested capital outflows that might have put pressure
on the peso.
This policy instrument induced high interest rates in the
whole system (see Table IV.9). The Manila Reference Rate
jumped to 25-¾ percent and bank lending rates jumped to
30 percent in September 1984 which further induceda massive
decline in trade and inventory financing.
4. Guaranteeingand Foreign Borrowing
Policies to restrict the use of foreign loans were also insti-
tuted. Letter of Instruction 1366 dated 25 November 1983
prohibits all government financial institutions from extending
any guarantee to secure foreign loans or obligations. The
approval of the President on all direct borrowing by all govern-
ment owned or controlled corporations was imposed by P.D.
1930 (5 June 1984).
B. Actions in Responseto the Crisis
The other aspect of policy responseto the economic crisis is
the set of actual measuresundertaken by monetary and fiscal author-
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Table IV.9
INTEREST RATES
(Averagefor the Month, in PercentPerYear)
n
Manila Bank
ReferenceRate= Time Lending
90 aJ Depositb.j Rate
i ir i i
March1983 14-9[16 14.03 18.56
June 1983 14-1[2 12.81 18.31
September 1983 15-1/4 13.47 17.05
December 1983 17-1[16 14.96 20.88
March 1984 16-15[16 15.31 21.46
June 1984 22-1/4 20.83 25.44
September 1984 25-3/4 23.36 29:67
I
a-/90-dayManila ReferenceRate
b-/61-90days
_60 daysandlessfor securedloans.
Source: Central Bank
ities during the period. In a financial system such asthat prevailing
in the Philippines, government authorities have a larger scope for
discretionary action because of the non-existence of a full set of
financial markets (a reliable official foreign exchange market is an
important missing market) and because of the relative dominance
of government banks in the financial markets that exist.
Unlike the case of rules, there are no direct information on the
actual actions by the monetary authorities. Only an analysis of
the movement of monetary indicators and their components can
be done to review their actions. These indicators reflect the effect
of both the rules and actions and some effort must be applied to
disentangle the two.
Reserve money grew by 49 percent for the whole year of 1983
and by 69 percent for the period June 1983 to June 1984 (see
Table IV.10). By any yardstick, these numbers cannot reflect a
disinflationary monetary policy. The quantum jump apparently
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occurred in the last quarter of 1983 because in the nine-month
period between December 1983 and September 1984, the growth
rate had fallen to 3.4 percent. The apparently expansionary mo-
netary development is compounded by the fact that the contribution
of net foreign assetsduring the period was decidedly negative: net
foreign assets fell by 145 percent through the year of 1983 and
by 146 percent for the year beginning June I, 1983 and ending June
1984. The massive increase in the monetary base can only be traced
to increasesin net domestic credits.
1. Revaluation Effects
Net domestic assetsincreasedby 155 percent in the year
1983 and by 61 percent in the year ending June 1984. What
were the sources of this growth? Revaluation effects generated
the biggest source of growth in the period of three discrete de-
valuations. These revaluations come from three sources: stock
revaluation, swap losses, and forward losses. These increases
arose mainly from the cover provided by the Central Bank
against foreign exchange losses. When the losses actually oc-
curred, the Central Bank effectively lent more in the amount
of the loss. The revaluation effect alone was larger than the
increase in net domestic assets in 1983. Net domestic credit
arising from revaluation increased by 745 percent in the year
1983 and by 324 percent from June 1983 to June 1984.
It is reasonable to view the revaluation effect as non-discre-
tionary within the immediate crisis period. These were commit-
ments arising from the previous regime of aggressive borrowing.
Their adverse effects were reaped on the day of reckoning when
devaluation became inescapable.
The Central Bank compounded the increase in liquidity
in the last quarter of 1984 by falling to collect all the peso
equivalent of foreign obligations of the financial System.
it must also be i_ointed out that huge liquidity advantages
which the revaluation differentials might have afforded com-
mercial banks did not materialize because the Central Bank
blocked the deposits created by the liability.
After removing the revaluation effect (see the last line of
Table IV.10), net domestic assets actually declined by 9 percent
in the year 1983. Net domestic assets excluding revaluation
increased by 5 percent in the year ending June 1984 and 8
percent in the firstnine months of 1984. The inescapable con-
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clusion is that in the period when inflation exceeded40 percent,
discretionary monetary policy has been disinflationary on net
domestic credit. It is the distribution of the burden of adjust-
ment of these discretionary actions that is important. In this
regard, the bias toward placing a greater burden on the private
financial sector becomes very obvious. In 1983, net credits
to the public sector increasedby 55 percent while net credits
to the financial system (which includes credits to the Philippine
National Bank and other government financial institutions)
declined by 8 percent (see Table IV.IO). In the twelve-month
period from June 1983 to June 1984, net credits to the public
sector grew by 88.5 percent while thoseto the financial system
fell by 34.4 percent. The latter recovered to the December
1982 levelonly in September1984.
The blocking of the revaluation, which induced deposits
with the Central Bank, shut off a potential sourceof credit to
the private banking system in the midst of the crisis; The pre-
vious government policy of maintaining an overvalued exchange
rate, low domestic interest rates and generous forward cover
made it profitable for the private banking system to aggressive-
ly increaseitsforeign exchange exposure. (It also permitted a
greater rate of increasein the overall inflow of short-termcredit
to the country.) The action of the monetary authoritiesto block
the overvaluation gainsof the private banking systemcan be seen
as an act of managementcontrol to limit the unfavorable effects
of bad policy in the past.
2. Public Sector Lending
The increase in net credits to the public sector took the form
of budgetary loans and overdrafts which were resorted to in the
wake of governmen_ revenue shortfalls. (There was actually
an overall drop of government securities held by the Central
Bank in the period.) The budgetary _l_oansportion increasedby
85.2 percent in 1983, by 113.6 percent in the twelve-month
period ending March i984, and by 82.3 percent in the nine-
month period from June 1983 to March 1984. In the fourth
quarter of 1983 alone, budgetary loans increasedby 44.7 per-
cent. Overdrafts by the public sector on the Central Bank were
negligible before the fourth quarter of 1983 when a jump to
P1,946 million was recorded. At the end of the first quarter of
1984 a doubling of the figure tot_3,952 million wasrecorded.
The reduction in net lending to deposit money banks took
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the form mainly of a reduction in rediscounting (a 52.0 percent
drop between March 1983 and March 1984) and the effect
of open market operations when the Central Bank issued reverse
repurchase instruments (a ten-fold increase in these liabilities
of the Central Bank between March 1983 and March 1984),
There was an increase in net lending by the Central Bank
to "other financial entities," a category that includes thrift
banks, but mainly includes the government banks - the Develop-
ment Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Land Bank. The
increase in this item was registered mainly in the fourth quarter
of 1983 when an increase of 24,5 percent was recorded. The
principal reasons for this increase were two" (1) the increase in
emergency loans to thrift banks in the same quarter in response
to massive withdrawals by depositors and (2) the effort to keep
the DBP functional.
The large increase in black market activities in the economy
starting the fourth quarter of 1983 caused a rise in the cur-
rency-deposit ratio (see Table IV.11) and caused further re-
ductions in the private financial system's resources. This ratio
continued to increase in 1984 so that by September, the ratio
had increased by 61.7 percent over that of the previous twelve-
Table IV.11
MULTIPLIER, VELOCITY AND CURRENCY DEPOSIT RATIO
Currency
M3 Deposit
Multiplier a_/ Velocity b/ Ratio c/
March 1983 5.63 0.91 118.6
June 1983 6.21 0.95 98.6
September1983 5.71 0.89 111.1
December1983 4.07 0.96 151.9
March 1984 4.68 1.18 138.6
June 1984 1.14 1.23 148.3
September 1984 3.78 n.a. 179.7
a/Ratio of M3 to reservemoney.
b/Nominal GNP divided by M3.
C/Ratio of Currency in circulation to demand deposit.
Source of BasicData: Central Bank
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month period.
C. Evaluation of the Monetary Policies
The overall effect of these actions by the monetary authorities
can be seen in Table IV.11. Since June 1983, the M3 multiplier,
which reflects the overall ability of the financial system to convert
reserve money for credit to the economy was cut almost by half
from 6.21 to 3.78 by September 1984. The combination of increases
in reserverequirementsand the Central Bank's restriction of credit to
the financial system proved effective. During the same period velo-
city increasedfrom 0.89 to 1.23 as the nominal money stock lagged
behindthe price increasescontained in nominal GNP.
After all the policy actions, the monetary system had a sharply
reducedcredit expansion capability. The current policy is to main-
tain reservemoney at itspresentlevel.
As hasbeen suggestedin the previousanalysis,monetary policies
had been directed at maintaining failing government corporations
(such as the DBP) and making up for the sudden revenue shorfalls
of the government. Overall, the discretionary actions of the mo-
netary authorities were disinflationary. However, the massive
increasein lending to the public sector and to government financial
institutions during the same period required an equally massive
withdrawal of credit to the private sector as has been previously
documented.
There is no doubt that this credit withdrawal reduced domestic
spending, a goal of the stabilization program. The question of
whether this reduction should have been borne more by the govern-
ment can however be raised. Were the purposesto which govern-
ment applied the credit that it used truly crucial?7/To fully discuss
all the other aspectsof this issueraisesall the other questionsabout
the government'srole in the makingof the crisisitself. At this point,
it is sufficient tO point out that when the crisisstruck, the govern-
ment's immediate responsewas to consider its requirements first
and then the requirementsof all other sectors.
The most controversial aspect of the monetary policy response
to the crisis had to do with the raising of domestic interest rates.
7/For a related study, see Lamberte (1984). The said study has analyzed the financial
status of DBP in relation to the 1983-84 financial crisis. DBP borrowed heavily from the
Central Bank_ national government and from external sources to finance "priority" projects.
It is saddled with non-performing assets however. Its efforts to bail out many ailing corpo-
rations did not produce the desired results.
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As hasbeen pointed out, this policy was carried out through the role
of CB bills which paid high interest rates.
The effectiveness of the strategy in defending the exchange
rate cannot be questioned. What must be questioned is its place
in the current recovery program. The policy instrument used
induced high domestic interest rates which put at risk the survival
of companies whose difficulties endanger the adjustment effort
itself. The old exchange rate System and government budget deficits
were important contributory factors to the crisis. That the
constraints in the removal of these sources of trouble might have
caused further permanent damage during the recovery period is a
matter of concern.
IV.4 PRICE ADJUSTMENTS
This section deals with the price intervention policies exercised
by the government during the crisis. The inflationary effects of the
upward price adjustments of certain key commodities will be
examined in a later section.
A. Objectives ofthe Price Intervention Policies
There have been price intervention policies long before the
present crisis. These have been used mainly to protect consumers,
particularly the urban row income groups, against unreasonable
price increases. The government merely continued to wield these
policies during the crisis period. However, starting October 1984,
there seemsto be an apparent shift towards deregulation.
For the past decade, socialized pricing has been used extensive-
ly in basic commodities, petroleum products, electricity and house
rent. About thirteen commodities have been in the list of the
Price Stabilization Council. The list includes rice, corn grits, chicken,
eggs, pork, sugar, milk, canned fish and some school supplies. In
addition, prices of petroleum products have been regulated. For
instance, diesel, kerosene and LPG which are commodities used
by lower income groups, are priced lower than gasoline and other
pertoleum products. Electricity rates are also varied to favor the
smaller users. These measuresare all intended to lessenthe impact of
price increaseson the lower income groups.
Moreover, apartments whose rentals were less than 1_300 a
month were allowed only a 10 percent increase in rent annually.
Transport fares are also regulated and the prices are set by the Board
of Transportation after consultations with the operators and con.
4o
sumersin public hearings. •
The various price intervention policies often have conflicting
objectives. For example, the priceof rice iscontrolled soasto assure
stable and low price for low-income consumers. At the same time,
the government has to defend a farm floor price to give higher in-
comes to farmers and encourage them to produce more to achieve
food self-sufficiency. Another example of a conflict in objectives
is evident in petroleum product pricing. Considering their im-
portance as factor inputs, minimal increasein the pricesof petroleum
products commensurate to the rate of depreciation of the pesoare
desirable. But the government imposed higher taxes on these pro-
ducts in an effort to raise revenues, thus, effecting higher price
increases. The examples help demonstrate the conflicting objectives
of the price intervention policies of government, objectives such
as: 1) low prices, 2) stable prices, 3) higher farm income, 4) more
government revenues,and 5) food self-sufficiency.
B. Price Adjustments
In view of the series of de facto devaluations that took place
between 1983 and 1984, pricesof basic commodities were adjusted
upwards. The support price for palay went up by 97.1 percent
from June 1983 to December 1984 to cover increasedproduction
costsdue to the seriesof exchangerate adjustments. Consequently,
the real price of rice went up by 72.6 percent. The price adjust-
ments for corn were almost simultaneouswith those for rice. The
support price increased by 92.3 percent and the retail price by 79.1
percent over the same period. Table IV.12 shows the changes in
the support pricesand the price ceilingsfor riceand corn.
Price ceilings of other PSC-controlled commodities were also
adjusted upwards to account for higher production costs. Price
ceilings of food items were increasedon 16 occasionsSinceJune
1983. Table IV.13 Shows the percentage increases of the eight
food items covered by the PSC. The prices of non-food PSC-con-
trolled items Werealso adjustedduring the period.
The long-standingpolicy of price control, however, wasreversed
during the last quarter of 1984. A seriesof delisting actions Were
effected starting with chicken, pork and eggson 12 October 1984.
A few days later, corn grits wasalsotaken off from the price control
list. On 22 November 1984, the market prices of sugar, canned fish
and canned liquid milk were allowed to prevail. At present, rice is
the only item being controlled. There are indications, however,
that this will also be taken off the list. This deregulation is part
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Table IV.12
PRICE OF RICE AND CORN
SupportPrices Retail Prices
Palay Corn Rice CornGrit
Date of Effectivity (l_/kg) _P/kg) (_/kg.) (t_/kg)
f
October 1, 1983 1.80 1.40 _/ 3.30 2.30
•November27, 1983 2.10 1.65
December1, 1983 3.30 2.70
May 25, 1984 2.35 2.00
May 26, 1984 4.25 3.25
junc 9, 1984 2.65 2.30 4.85 3.85
October 20, 1984 2.90 2.50 5.35 delisted
a/1 September1983 for Corn.
Sources:Price Stabilization Council and NFA.
Table IV.13
PERCENTAGE INCREASES OF PRICE CEILINGS
(Asof 11 October 1984)
f fI'ercent Increases
Relativeto
Commodities , June1, 1983
Rice 72.58
Sugar 88.43
Corn Grits 79.07
Pork 120.81
Chicken 93,20
Eggs 104.44
Canned Fish 131.11
SchoolPads 73.64
Canhed Liquid Milk 133.67
CompositionNotebook 73.13
Spiral Notebook 75.76
Pencil 121.43
Source: Price Stabilization Council.
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of the strategy to encourage greater production of these commo-
dities.
Table IV.14 shows the changesin the domestic prices of petro-
leum products since July 1983. For the last eighteen months, their
pricesroseby 129.7 percenton the average, sl This is in response
to the de facto devaluationsas well as the additional taxes imposed.
The de facto devaluationson 23 June 1983, 5 October 1983 and 6
June 1984, and the floating of the peso starting in October 1984
increasedthe pesocost of fuel imports. Additional ad valorem tax
on imports of petroleum products, through Executive Order Nos.
918 (3 November 1983), 946 (29 April 1984) and 955 (6 June
1984), further increasedthe domestic pricesof petroleum products.
Moreover, the government took these occasions to increase the
specific tax componentsof the petroleum products. As mentioned
earlier, these measures were adopted to meet the government's
requirementsof higher revenues.
On 20 October 1984, the price structure of petroleum products
was revisedto reflect current developments. 9/ Presidential Decree
No. 1956 created the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) to be
usedto refund lossesof oil companiesas a result of future deprecia-
tions of the peso or a rise in the world price of oil. The OPSF
levy was set at 10 centavosper liter by the Boardof Energy.
The decree also abolished the Oil Industry Special Fund which
was used on oil productS. It set this levy as a percentageof the oil
companies'shareof the price, averagingP0.99 per liter.
The additional levies have increased the government's take by
t=0.427 per liter. The oil companies have been given an increaseof
P0.292 per liter to cover the higher pesocostsof imported crude oil.
The BOE has also granted an increase in the dealer's margin of
PO.04 per liter for gasoline and diesel, and P0.01 per liter for LPG.
Being committed to ensuring stable and low prices for low-
income consumersand industrial users,the socializedpricing scheme
for petroleum products has been retained. Thus, although the prices
of petroleum products were adjusted upwards, the prices of those
petroleum products usually used by the lower income groups and
8/The volume of sales for each of the different petroleum products were used as
weights to get the average wholesale posted price (WPP). The increase indicated above was
obtained by getting the percentage change in the WPP.
9/Executive Order No. 988 which took effect October 15, has reduced the import
surcharge on crude oil from 10 percent to 5 percent, thereby reducing the rate on import
duty on crude oil from 30 percent to 25 percent.
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the industrial sector are still priced relatively lower than the rest) °/
Transport fares have increased on eight occasions as a conse-
quence of the fuel price adjustments (see Table IV.15). For or-
dinary buses and jeepneys, the minimum rate went up by an average
of 84.6 percent over the period while the rate for each additional
kilometer increased by 117.9 percent on the average. This has direct-
ly affected the consumers in the form of higher bus, jeepney and
taxi fares and indirectly through higher transport costs for producers
and traders.
Table IV.14
DOMESTIC PRICES OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS,
(_/LITER)
JULY 1983 - JUNE 1984
July Nov. May June Oct.
Petroleum 1, 3, 18, 7, 20,
Product 1983 1983 1984 1984 1984
(e) (_) (e) (e)
Premiumgasoline 5.470 6.470 6.890 8.280 9.24
Regulargasoline 5.270 6.270 6.690 8.030 8.8-1
Diesel 3.430 4.430 4.890 7.724 7.26
Kerosene 3.440 4.440 4.890 6.210 7.17
Fuel Oil 2.404 3.404 3.664 4.645 5.1933
LPG 2.877 3.827 4.139 5.337 6.065
Avturbo 4.901 5.901 6.294 7.724 9.049
Solvents 4.626 5.626 5.816 7.186 8.6646
Asphalts 2.877 3.878 4.157 5.168 5.5723
Note: For gasoline,diesel and kerosene, the retail pricesare usedwhile the
wholesalepostedpricesare usedfor the other products.
Source: Board of Energy.
The import surcharge instituted in December 1982 applies
to both fuel and non-fuel imports. Executive Order No. 918 raised
the surcharge from 3 percent to 5 percent on 3 November 1983.
This was further raised to 8 percent on 29 March 1984 through
10/See Section IV.2 for the impact of the change in the specific tax of petroleum pro-
ducts on different income groups.
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Executive Order No. 946. In an effort to raise more revenuesand
dampen imports at the same time, this was again revisedupwardsto
10 percent effective 6 June 1984 as provided for by EO No. 955.
Consequently, tkis provided additional upward pressureon prices.
Utility rates have also gone up considerably during the period
coveredby the study. Averagewater tariff increasedby 50 percent,
while averagepower tariff roseby 64 percent.
MERALCO increased its rates to cover the added peso costs
of its foreign exchange expenditures due to the seriesof de facto
devaluations and the higher operation costs due to inflation. The
new rate structure was adoptedstarting July 1984.
In line with the policy of removing pricedistortions, MERALCO
will reduce the amount of subsidizedelectrical consumption starting
1985. The six year program allows for the reduction of the sub-
sidized electricity consumption of individual consumersfrom 200
kwh to 150 kwh while the 90 kwh subsidizedconsumption of small
commercial customerswill be lessenedto 75 kwh. In the next five
years, subsidized residential consumption will be further reduced
by 20 kwh every year and commercial establishments by 5 kwh
yearly.
In another effort to easethe burden of rising priceson the low
income groups, particularly those in the urban sectors,Presidential
Decree No. 1912 was issuedwhich extended Batas Pambansa Big.
125 up to December 1984. BP Big. 25, which provided for a
maximum 10 percent annual increase for apartments covered by
PD 20, would have ended last April 1984. While this legislation
serves to control the increase in rents, this may also have adverse
effects since apartment owners will be discouragedfrom doing re-
pairs and maintaining their units in good condition considering
the increasesin the cost of repair over the period.
In line with the current thrust on deregulation, Parliamentary
Bill No. 2587 was approved by the Batasanwhich provides for the
lifting of rent control on 1 July 1986. The law also allows for gra-
duated increases in rentals between 1 January 1985 to 1 july
1986.
C. The Desirability of Price Controls
Price controls are desirable only if they are used in the short-
run to effect gradual adjustments in prices brought about by severe
supply disturbances. In this case, consumerswill be sparedof un-
reasonable price increasesasthey correspondingly adjust the alloca-
tion of their resources. With inflation already very high either due
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to disruptions in supply or speculation, some price controls may
exist to arrest further increases in prices and to discourage further
speculations on commodity prices. However, some of the price
controls, which were really intended to be temporary, have become
regular features of the economic system.
While price controls may benefit the consumers in the short-
run in terms of lower prices, they may be detrimental in the long-
run. Setting the price artificially low may drive away existing pro-
ducers and prevent entry of new producers (which could lead to a
more competitive market), thereby causing acute shortages. These
may also cause producers to reduce the quality of their products in
an attempt to cut costs. Moreover, price controls give incorrect price
signals, thus preventing the efficient allocation of resources. For'
instance, the socialized pricing scheme for petroleum products has
favored the low income groups, but it also has some negative effects.
Due to the significant difference between gasoline and diesel prices,
there was a significant shift in demand from gasoline to diesel.
The resulting demand for these two products was inconsistent with
the refineries' output of the same products. Thus, a demand-supply
imbalance has been created. In this case, the price interventions
prevented prices from performing their critical role of signals to
direct the allocation of resourcesto their most efficient use.
As observed, price controls are directed at fixing the prices of
commodities and making the products available to all income groups.
This may be an inefficient way of helping the low income groups. "
Taking diesel prices as an example, if Subsidies for public transport
users are so desired, then other mechanisms should be considered
TableIV.I.S
TRANSPORTATIONFARESIN METROMANILA
Dateof Effectivity TransportMode Rate
before11 July1983 BusandJeepney -T=0,65for the first ,5kms.and
t=0.14 for every additional
km.
Taxi 10,65 for the first 500 m.and
_P0.50forevery300m.
11 July1983 BusandJeepney t_0.65 for the first .4kms.and
70.165 for every addition-
al km; later raisedto t=0.70
for the first 4 kms.for jeep-
neyonly
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6 November1983 Bus t=0.80 for the first .4 kms.and
=P0.21 for every additional
km
Jeepney 11=0.85for the first .4kms.and
"P0.21 for every additional
km
15 .November1983 Taxi 1=2.50 flagdownfor the first 500
m. andID0.60 for every 250
km thereafter
28 May 1984 BusandJeepney t=0.90. for the first 4 kms.and
1=0.22 for every additional
km
12 june 1984 Busand Jeepney t=1.00 for the first .4kms. and
t=O.265 for every additional
km
18 .JUne1984 Taxi f'2.50 flagdownfor thefirst.$O0
m, and 1_I.00 .for every suc-
ceeding 325 m
25 October 1984 Bus 1=1.20 for the first 4 kms. and
1_0.305 for every additional
krn
12 November 1984 Taxi _=¢2.50for fiagdown and _-I.00
for every 250 m.
Source: Board of Tmnsportetio_
because .only a small fraction (about 5 to 10 percent)of total diesel
use occurs in public transportation according to the Meta System's
study on Petroleum Products Pricing (1984).
IV.5 WAGE ADJUSTMENTS
The government's policy statement on workers' income has
been to relate wage adjustments to changes in productivity, increases
in the cost of living, and the economy's capacity to absorb these
changes. The inflationary pressures due to the recent peso devalua-
tions and increased tax rates have necessitated government inter-
vention to improve the level of minimum wages, The higher costs
Of. living, rather than productivity increases, prompted the govern-
ment_to adjust wages upwards.
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This section discussesthe wage adjustments effected by the
government during the period January 1983 to December 1984
and wage setting; sufficiency of the legislatedwages to meet the
basic needs of the worker and his/her family; the coverage of the
minimum wage laws; and, degree of compliance by employer with
the legislationsOf wage. The impact of wage adjustments on em-
ployment and priceswill be consideredin later chapters.
A. Scopeof Wage-Setting
Minimum wage legislation in the Philippines started on 4 August
1951 with the passageof Republic Act No. 602, otherwise known
as the Minimum Wage Law. This provided for a P4.00 daily
minimum wage for non-agricultural workers and P2.00 for agricul-
tural workers. Since then, a total of twenty-seven laws in the form
of legislative acts, presidential decreesand wage orders have been
effected. Four bills were enacted in the sixties while twelve were
passedin the seventies. Eleven laws have already been issuedin the
present decade. The increasingtrend in the number Of laws issued
reflects the increasing dependence on minimum wage legislation
in improving the welfare of labor, particularly low incomeworkers,
in the form of higher minimum wage and/or increasedallowances.
Wage-setting in the Philippines underwent a significant change
beginning 1974, when wage legislation went beyond fixing the
minimum wage and included the payment of allowances and
thirteenth month pay. This tended to favor the workers in terms of
higher pay and wider coverage. The latter is brought aboUt by
lawswhich provided for additional allowancesevento those workers
receivingmore than the minimum wage. On the other hand, this also
brought several problems. The increasedscope of wage legislation
has made it more difficult to enforce them. Moreover, the complex
wage structure makes it more difficult on the part of the workers
to know what is due them. The changealso brought to attention
the seemingly wavering stance of the government with regard to
workers' income. While the broader scopeof wage legislation seeks
to increaseworkers' income, the increasingincidence of exemptions
of certain sectors and/or "distressed" companies only serveto em-
phasizethe unevenapplication of these laws.
Although wage adjustments have been tied up with increasesin
prices, there has been no explicit policy on the adjustments them-
selves. In some cases,the magnitude of the increasesin legislated
wageshave compensatedfully for the lossin purchasingpower since
the last adjustment. The more recent trends, however,show that the
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increasesin wages have not really brought back real wagesto their
former levels. Is our wage policy suchthat a benchmark real wage
is maintained? Or that percentage changesin minimum wage should
only be a certain proportion (lessthan one) of the inflation rate?
B. WageAdjustments
The present crisis has induced record-high inflation. With the
year-on-year inflation ratessteadily increasing from 16.8 percent in
November 1983 and peaking to 63.8 in October 1984, the pur-
chasingpower of the pesohasbeen continuously decreasing.
To protect the workers against the erosion of their incomes
due to inflation, five wage orders have been implemented since
June 1983. Wage Order No. 2 provided for increasesin the mini-
mum and living allowance rates on two occasions: 6 July 1983
and 1 October 1983. Wage Order No. 3 which was issuedon 1
November 1983 further increasedthe living allowance in two steps,
implemented one month apart.
On 1 May 1984, Wage Order No. 4 was issuedwhich led to the
integration of the allowances provided for by P.D. Nos. 1614;
1634, 1678 and 1713 into the basicminimum wage. This benefitted
the workers in two ways: 1) the amount integrated into the basic
wage was slightly more than the sum of the allowances previously
granted by the P.D.s, and 2) the overtime pay, 13th month pay
and social security benefits, which are all basedon the basic wage,
have correspondinglyincreased. However, the integration also.meant
higher taxes and socialsecurity contributions for workers.
Effective 16 June 1984, the basic minimum wage and cost of
living allowance was again increased through Wage Order No. 5.
The most recent increase in the legislated minimum wage was
through WageOrder No. 6, effective 1 November 1984. It increased
the minimum wage by Pl.50 to P2.00 per day and the cost of
living allowance by P1.50 to _3.00 per day.
Tables IV.16 to IV.19 show the changesin the legislated mini-
mum wages of agricultural and non-agricultural workers resulting
from the five wage orders. The effective daily minimum wage
(EMW)of workers consists of the basic minimum wages, the cost
of living allowance (COLA) and the daily equivalent of the man-
dated thirteenth month pay. The EMW has increasedby five times
since 1972. However, a closer look at the EMW revealsthat before
1984, a substantial portion of the increasein the EMW wasdue to
significant increasesin its COLA component. In fact, in December
1983, the COLA and 13th-month pay components were even slight-
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Table IV.16
LEGISLATEEI WAGES IN THE NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTOR,
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, 1983-1.984
Wage Date Costof 13th Effective
Order of Minimum Living Month Minimum
No. Effectivity Wage AlloWance Pay WageRate
0_) _ (t=-)
III
2 ' 1983 July 6 19.00 13.82 1.58 34.40
OctoberI 19.00 14.82 1.58 35.40
3 November1 20;00 17.82 1.67 39.49
December1 21:00 19.32 1.75 42.07
4 1984 May 1 32.00 9.00 2.67 43.67
5 June16 35.00 14.00 2.92 51.92
6 November1 37.00 17.00 3.00 57.00
Source: National WagesCouncil, Ministry of Labor and Employment.
Table IV.17
LEGISLATED WAGES IN THE NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTOR,
AREAS OUTSIDE THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION,
1983-1984
fn i I
Wage Date Cost of 13th Effective
Order of Minimum Living Month Minimum
No. Effectivity Wage AllOwance Pay WageRate
(e) _ _) (_)
2 1983 July 6 18.00 13.82 1.5.0 33.32
October 1 18.00 14.82 1.58 34.32
3 November1 19.00 17,82 1.58 38.40
December1 20.00 18.33 1.67 40.99
4 1984 May 1 31.00 9.00 2.58 42.58
5 June16 34.00 14.00 2.83 50.83
6 November1 36.00 17.00 3.00 56.00
Source: National WagesCouncil, Ministry of Labor and Employment.
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Table IV.18
LEGISLATED WAGESIN THE AGRICULTU RAL SECTOR,
PLANTATION, 1983-1984
In III
Wage Date Cost of 13th Effective
Order of Minimum Living Month Minimum
No. Effectivity Wage Allowance Pay WageRate
2 1983 July 6 16.00 10.42 1.33 27.75
October I 16.00 11.42 1,33 28.75
3 November1 17.00 13.92 1.42 32,34
December1 18.00 14.92 1.50 34.42
4 1984 May 1 27.00 6.50 2.25 35.75
5 June16 30.00 10.00 2.50 42.50
6 November 1 32.00 12.00 2.65 46.65
Source: National WagesCouncil, Ministry of Labor and Employment.
Table IV.19
LEGISLATED WAGESIN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR_
NON-PLANTATION, 1983.1984
Wage Date Costof 13th Effective
Order of Minimum Living Month Minimum
No. Effectivity Wage Allowance Pay WageRate
0") 09
v_
2 1983 July 6 15.00 5.48 1.25 20.73
October 1 15.00 6.48 1.25 21.73
3 November 1 16.00 6.48 1.33 23.81
December 1 17.00 7.48 1.42 25.90
4 1984 May 1 21.00 4.00 1.75 26.75
5 June16 24.00 6.00 2.00 32.00
6 November1 26.00 7.50 2.15 35.65
Source: National WagesCouncil, Ministry of Labor and Employment.
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ly higher than the basic minimum wage rate for non-agricultural
workers, almost the same for plantation workers and about half
for non-plantation workers. It Was only through Wage Order NO.
4, which provided for the integration of most of the allowances
previously granted, that this trend was reversed.
C. Sufficiency of WageAdjustments
The five wage legislationsmentioned above have increased the
effective daily minimum wage by an average of P25.22 for non-
agricultural workers and Pl 8.24 for agricultural workersl Asof june
1984, these measureshave brought back the real wagesfor both
types of workers to their 1982 levels, even higher than the June
1983 levels (see Tables IV.20 to IV.23). This indicates that the in-
creases in legislated money wages from July 1983 to June 1984
were commensurate to the increase in prices for the same period,
as measured by the Consumer Price Index. In July 1984, however,
real wage started to decline due to the big jump in prices without
any corresponding increase in legislated wages. The declining trend
in real wages was reversed only in November of the same year
when the legislated wage was increased through WageOrder No. 6.
The increase, however, was not enough to compensate for the loss
in purchasing power due to inflation since the last wage adjustment
in June 1984. Continuing price rises, however, are expected to quick-
ly erode the gains in real wages over the next months, unless legisla-
ted money wages are again increased or counter-inflationary mea-
suresare successful.
The present income package has to be compared with the mini-
mum income required to meet the basic needs of an averagefamily.
Several researchers have come up with their own estimates of sub-
sistence income, and these can be used to evaluate the government-
determined minimum wage levels. The more notable of these studies
are those done by Abrera (1974), Tan and Holazo (1975), the World
Bank (1975) and the Center for Research and Communication
(1982).
The National Wages Council (NWC), the advisory body to the
President on wage-related matters estimated the average cost of
daily food and other basic necessities (ACDFOBN) to be P52.13
as of June 1981. This figure wasbased on the averagecost of daily
nutritional requirements for the reference family of six, computed
to be P32.32 The total figure of P52.13for ACDFOBN was derived
by assuming that food items-constitute 62 percent of total expendi-
ture.
Using the growth rate of CPI for food items in Metro Manila,
the average costs of daily nutritional requirement were estimated
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Table IV.20
LEGISLATED MONEY AND REAL WAGES IN THE NON-AGRICULTURAL
SECTOR, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, 1981 - JULY 1984
Consumer Legislated
Legislated Priceindex RealWage
Money Wage (1978=100) Rate
Period (_ (_) (P)
1981 31.82 156.9 20.28
1982 31.82 176.1 18.07
1983
June 31.82 187.2 17.00
July 34.40 193.3 17.80 I
August 34.40 195.4 17.60
September 34.40 195.8 17.57
October 35.40 200.7 17.64
November 39.49 219.4 18.00
December 42.07 236.6 17.78
1984
January 42.07 250.3 16.81
February 42.07 255.4 16.47
March 42.07 256.4 16.41
April 42.07 258.5 16.27
May 43.67 264.0 16.54
june 51.92 285.7 18.18
july 51.92 306.5 16.94
August 51.92 313.6 16.56
September 51.92 319.0 16.28
October 51.92 318.3 16.31
November 57.00 332.7 17.13
Source: Notional WagesCouncil, Ministry of Labor and Employment.
53
Table IV.21
LEGISLATED MONEY AND REAL WAGESIN THE NON-AGRICULTURAL
SECTOR, AREAS OUTSIDE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION,
1981 - JULY 1984
Consumer Legislated
Legislated Priceindex RealWage
Money Wage (1978=1OO) Rate
Period (_ (_) 0_)
1981 30,74 153.6 20.01
1982 30,74 172.6 17.81
1983
June 30,74 183.9 16.72
July 33,32 188.0 17,72
August 33.32 191.6 17.39
September 34,32 192.4 17.84
October 34,32 194.4 17.65
November 38,40 204.9 18.74
December 40,99 221.5 18.51
1984
January 40,99 235.9 17.38
February 40,99 243.5 16.83
March 40,99 249.7 16.42
April 40,99 253,9 16.14
May 42,58 257.9 16.51
june 50.83 273.2 18.60
July 50,83 298.5 17.07
August 50.83 307.1 16.55
September 50.33 315.1 16.13
October 50.83 320.4 15.86
November 56.00 332.6 16.84
I
Source: National WagesCouncil, Ministry of Labor and Employment,
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Table IV.22
LEGISLATED MONEY AND REAL WAGES IN THE NON-AGRICULTURAL
SECTOR, PLANTATION, 1981 - JULY 1984
Consumer Legislated
Legislated Priceindex RealWage
Money Wage (1978=100) Rate
Period if') (if) (1=)
1981 26.18 153.6 17.04
1982 26.18 172.6 15.17
1983
June 26.18 183.9 14,24
July 27.75 188.0 14.76
August 27.75 191.6 14.48
September 27.75 192.4 14.42
October 28.75 194.4 14.79
November 32.34 204.9 15.78
December 34,42 221.5 15.54
1984
January 34.42 235.9 14.59
February 34.42 243.5 14.14
March 34.42 249.7 1338
April 34.42 253.9 13.56
May 35,75 257.9 13.86
June 35.75 273.2 15.57
July 42.50 298.5 14.24
August 4250 307.I 13.84
September 42,50 315.1 13.49
October 42.50 320.4 13.26
November 46.65 332.6 14.03
Source: National WagesCouncil, Ministry of Labor and Employment.
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Table IV.23
LEGISLATED MONEY AND REAL WAGES IN THE NON-AGRICULTURAL
SECTOR, NON-PLANTATION, 1981 - j ULY 1984
Consumer Legislated
Legislated Priceindex • .RealWage
Money Wage (1978-100) Rate
Period _ (_) (1=)
1981 19.65 153.6 12.79
1982 19,65 172.6 11.38
1983
june 19.,65 183.9 10.68
July 20,73 188.0 11,03
August 20.73 191.6 10.82
September 20,73 192.4 10.77
October 21.73 194.4 11,18
November 23.81 204.9 11.62
December 25.90 221.5 11.69
1984
January 25.90 235.9 10.98
February 25.90 243.5 10.64
March 25.90 249.7 10.37
April 25.90 253.9 10.20
Miy 26.75 257.9 10.37
June 32.00 273.2 11.71
July 32.00 298.5 10.72
August 32.00 307.1 10.42
September 32.00 315..1 10.16
October 32.00 320.4 9,99
November 35.65 332.6 10.72
Source: National WegesCouncil, Ministry of Labor and Employment.
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for july 1983 to November 1984. The averagecost of daily food
and other basic necessitieswere derived, using the overall CPI
for Metro Manila. The resultsare shownin Table IV.24.
Relating these figures with the take-home pay of minimum wage
workers shown in Table IV.25, it is clear that an averagehousehold
with only one minimum wage worker will not be able to meet its
basic nutritional requirements.However, with two full:time workers
in the family, the basic food needscould be met but not the other
needs. According to the NCSO, the average number of employed
workers per family is about 2.0.
The NWC estimates, as compared to the results of the other
studies shown in Table IV.26, more or lesslie in the middle of the
scale. If we use the Tan-Holazo study, which givesthe lowest esti-
mates, a family with two employed membersreceivingthe legislated
minimum pay would be more than ableto support their basicneeds.
D. Coverage
The next issuerelates to the coverage of these wage legislations.
In general, the legislatedwageswould apply to those workers in the
formal private Sectors. Excluded are individuals working in the in-
formal sector and government employees. Regardingthe latter group,
several laws have been issuedwhich provided for increased salary
and/or allowances. In November 1983, an additional1=100 cost-of-
living allowance was granted to government workers. Executive
Order No. 951-A provided for a 10 percent acrossthe board salary
increaseto officials and employeesof government owned/or control-
led corporations and financial institutions, effective 1 May 1984. in
June 1984, President Marcos approved a Cabinet recommendation
granting additional =1=100to _150 cost-of-living to the 1.2 million
national government employees. Notwithstanding all these adiust-
merits, the actual minimum wage rate in the government sector is
lessthan the legislatedeffective minimum wage rate in the private
sector. Thus, how many are actually benefitted by the minimum
wage legislation?How effective are these minimum wagelegislations
in helping the averageFilipino worker?
According to the National WagesCouncil, about 23 percent of
thoseemployed in 1983 are minimum wage workers. These would
be the workers directly affected by the minimUm wage laws. In
addition, workers who are earning lessthan t)I, ,800.00 a month are
also benefitted in terms of increasedallowances. Theseadjustments
may also tend to push up the incomes of the other workers in order
57
Table IV.24
AVERAGECOST OF BASICNEEDSa/
(Pesos,)
Average Average Average Average
Costof Costof Costof •Costof
Daily Daily Monthly Monthly
Food Basic Food Basic
Needs Needs Needs Needs
Period (P) 0_) (P) (t=)
1983
june 36:94 62.48 1,108.20 1 874.40
I uly 37.70 64.51 1,131.00 19.38.30
August 38.26 65.21 1,147.80 1 956.30
Soptember 38.16 65.35 1,144.80 1 960.50
October 39.56 66.98 1,186.80 2 009.40
November 44.17 73.22 1,325.10 ' 2 1'96.60
December 48.49 78.96 1,454.70 2 368.80
1984
January 50.69 83.53 1,520.70 2,505.93
February 52.15 85.24 1,564.50 2,557.20
March 51.82 85.57 1,554.60 2,567.10
April 52.06 86.27 1,561.80 2,588.10
May 53.92 88.11 1,617.60 2,643.30
Juric 59.02 95;35 1,770.60 2,860.50
July 63.92 102.29 1,917;60 3,068.70
August 66.39 104.66 1,991.70 3,139.80
September 68.03 106.46 2,040.90 3,193.80
October 67.00 106.23 2,010.00 3,186.90
November 70.60 111.03 2,1'18.00 3,330.90
-a-/Fora family of six,living in Metro Manila
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Table IV.25
AVERAGE DAILY AND MONTHLY TAKE-HOME PAY OF
MINIMUM WAGE EARNERS, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
Daily Monthly
Period Take-Home Take-Home
Pay Pay a_J
(f')
1983
June 28.96 731.38
july 31.46 794.50
August 31.46 794.50
September 31.46 794.50
October 32.46 819.76
November 36.20 914.76
December 38.70 977.28
i 984
January 38.70 977.28
February 38.70 977.28
March 38.70 977,28
April 38.70 977.28
May 39.38 944.45
june 47.38 1,196.45
July 47.38 1,196.45
August 47.38 1,1'96.45
September 47.38 1,196.45
October 47.38 1,196.45
November 49.50 1,249.87
December 49.50 1,249.87
a/This assumesan averageof 25.25 working daysper month.
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Table IV.26
POVERTY TH RESHOLDS
FEBRUARY 1984
|
1. Tan-Holazo (1975): With Food Variety
6-memberhousehold
a. Metro Manila 1,306.36
b. Philippines 1,082.43
2. World Bank(1975): 6-memberhousehold
"Least Cost" ConsumptionBasket
a. Urban 3,469.92
b. Rural 2,613.12
C. Philippines 2,784.48
3. Abrera (1974): 6-memberhousehold
a. ManilaandSuburb 2,997.85
b. Other UrbanAreas 2,487.76
c. Rural 2,1':71.74
4. Centerfor ResearchandCommunicatiOn
(January1982): 5.memberhousehold
a. Metro Manila 3,515.12
Source: Table takenfrom UPSE's"An Analysis of the Philippine Economic
Crisis,"(I 984).
to correct the resulting distortions in the wage structure within the
firms. The actual adjustments in the wage structure would depend,
of course, on the strength of the workers' groups in negotiating their
collective bargaining agreements.
E. Degree of Compliance
Another important aspect of the wage legislations is the degree
of compliance. The absence of government inspection teams makes
the enforcement of the various laws difficult. Employers have means
of circumventing these laws, such as hiring workers on casual basis
and keeping employees on an apprentice status beyond the period
allowed by law. The so-called distressed firms may even apply for
6O
exemption from these laws, .Further, the workers themselves may
agree to lower wagesin view of the high unemployment and under-
employment rates.
An increasingnumber of applications for exemptions from the
wage orders have been filed since the first wage order was issued.
Three hundred forty .applications were received by MOL.E in con-
nection with W.O. No. 1, of which 57 percent were approved. For
W.O. No. 2_ 590 firms applied for exemption and 37 percent were
granted. Out of 1,083 applicationsfiled in connection with W.O. No.
3, only 32 percent were approved. The fourth wage order provided
for mandatory increase and consequently no exemptions were pos-
sible. For W.O. No. 5,911 applications were receivedand 32 percent
havebeen granted. The risein the numberof applicationsfor exemp-
tions indicate that more and more firms find it harder to comply
with the wage increases.
Available information shows that for the period 1976 to 1979,
about-9 percentof the establishmentsinspectedwere found violating
minimum wage legislation, 19 percent violating laws on cost of living
allowancesand 12percent not following the rule of 13th-month pay.
For 1980 to 1981, basedon an inspection of establishmentswith
complaints from workers, the percentageswere much higher - 25
percent, 48 percent, and 21 percent, respectively_ Moreover, from
January to June 1984, about 28 percent of the actual strikes dec-
lared were due to violations of minimum wage legislation. In the
absenceof inspectionteams from the Ministry of Labor and Employ-
ment, it is likely that there .could be more firms notcomplying with
the legislatedwages.
A related concern is the relative impact of wage legislation on
different firms. While these laws are intended to improve the welfare
of the low-income workers, it may also prove to be inequitable in the
sense that "efficient" firms are the ones penalized. The firms, who
follow the laws strictly, will incur higher production costs due to in-
creased labor costs, and this may render them lesscompetitive in the
market.
To summarize, this section has focused on the wage adjustments
which have been instituted since June 1983. The sufficiency and
coverageof the adjustments have beenexamined. The analysis,how-
ever, dealt with the legislated wages only. An examination of the
impact of the present crisis on the actual incomesof the different
householdgroups would havebeen more desirable. The lack of cur-
rent information on this area, however, precludesany analysisof this
sort. Not only is there lack of data on actual incomesof different
income groups nor on changesin income distribution, but also on
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actual wages received. The Central Bank used tO publish a series on
nominal and real wages received by different types of workers. How-
ever, the CB stopped generating the series in 1980 and the slack was
not taken up by any other agency. In view of the importance of data
series on nominal and real wages, NEDA-NCSO should make this
undertaking a top priority project.
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ChapterV
EFFECTS OF THE VARIOUS MEASURES ON THE BALANCE
OF PAYMENTS, INFLATION, OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT
This chapter examines the effects of the various stabilization
measuresadopted by government on the balance of payments, infla-
tion, output and employment. It is divided into three sections. The
first section deals with the effects of t-hemeasuresor, the balance of
payments; the second, on inflation; and the last, on output and em-
ployment.
V.1 EFFECTS OF THE VARIOUS MEASURES ON THE BALANCE
OF PAYMENTS
It is still early to determine the full effects of the different policy
measureson the balance of payments although some indications Can
be gleaned from recent data. Looking at the trade balance, moderate
successseems to have been achieved so far. The deficit in the current
account was reduced drastically by 43.8 percent during the first
three quarters of 1984 ascompared to the same period in 1983. This
is mainly due to the large cutback in imports since export s achieved
only a modest growth in the same period (seeTable V.1 ).
The value of exports increased by 8.5 percent during the first
three quarters of 1984. The leading exports for 1984 are coconut
products, electronics and semi-conductors, and garments (see Table
V.2). Exports of coconut products rose by 44.5 percent in the first
semester of 1984 compared to the same period in 1983, electronics
by 17.7 percent and garments by 1"1.9 percent. Although export
taxes on coconut products were increased (plus initially the 30 per-
cent stabilization tax), these products enjoyed very favorable world
market prices. A number of traditional exports, notably sugar and
mineral products, suffered a substantial decline due mainly to the
depressed world market. On the whole, traditional exports fell by
around 12 percent in the first three quarters of 1984 compared to
the same period in 1982.
On the other hand, non-traditional exports, particularly electron-
ics and garments, which even at the start, Were exempted from the
30 percent stabilization tax, clearly benefitted from the recent de-
valuation and other trade policies (e.g., the various export incent-
ives). Total non-traditional exports grew by a healthy 21 percent
during the first three quarters of 1984. Optimism should, however,
be guarded. Electronics and garments, which are the main non-tradi-
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tional exports (comprising more than 30 percent of non-traditional
exports) have very low value added1./ It is well to note that quotas
are imposed on garment exports. In general, there is a rising protec-
tionism in the West. Future developments With regard to trade poli-
cies of trading partners would certainly have an effect on export
prospects.
Total imports, on the other hand, went down sharply by around
20 percent from the first three quarters of 1983 to the first three
quarters of 1984. This compares well with the 10.3 percent average
annual growth rate of total imports during the period 1975-1983.
The biggest cutback was for capital goods imports which fell by
around 35 percent during the period (see Table V.3).2/ There was
hardly any foreign exchange available for import of capital goods.
Moreover, foreign investors as well as domestic entrepreneurs were
hesitant to invest under the current economic and political uncer-
tainty. Imports of raw materials and intermediate goods declined
by only 13 percent during the same period since they are given
priority in foreign exchange allocation. Finally, as expected, import
of consumer goods went down substantially by around 28 percent.
The cutback on imports could be attributed to three main fac-
tors, namely: (1) exchange control (as manifested in priority list for
imports by the CB), (2) the series of de facto devaluations culmina-
ting in the free float of the peso which raised the price of foreign
goods, and (3) tight monetary and fiscal policies which effectively
reduced the economy's expenditure, particularly on imports, both
private and public.
As pointed out in the earlier chapters, exchange controls have
been mainly in the form of various CB measures which regulate for-
eign asset holdings of banks and impose a priority list for foreign
exchange allocation. Importations require prior CB approval, usually
upon recommendation or endorsement by the BOI or other govern-
ment agencies. Many other commodities are banned outright. Inte-
restingly, before the crisis, the Philippines was moving toward libera-
lizing import licensing. Under such program, a number of commodi-
ties were already deleted from import bans. However, when BOP
imb,_lance became more acute during the latter half of 1983, all
attempts at liberalization were stopped and exchange controls be-
1 /
"Furthermore, a high growth rate recorded for electronics may have been partly due
to better reporting.
2/Note that capital goods import was growing at an average annual rate of 6 percent
from 1975 to 1983.
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came very restrictive. At the start, foreign exchange earningswere
allocated only for interest and oil payments. The seriesof de facto
devaluationsthat resulted helped easethe needfor more controls. In
October 1984, more liberal measureswere initiated. The CB deregu-
lation On the bank's allowable foreign exchange retention may be
cited here as an example. Although the seriesof de facto devalua-
tions helped curb imports in the last one and a half years, direct ex-
change controls were considered a critical factor in bringing down
imports.
The presentcrisis hasproduced an inflation problem more severe
than that causedby the oil "shocksin 1974 and 1978. The successive
devaluationssince June 1983 and the imposition of additional taxes
sparkeda seriesof price adjustments. Just when the year-on-year in-
flation rate hasbeen reduced to a one-digit rate during the first half
of 1983, developments thereafter gave way to unprecedented infla-
tion ratessincethe 1950s.
The Consumer Price Index started to climb in June 1983, reach-
ing double digit year-on-year inflation rate by October of the same
year (see Table V.4). It continued to increaserapidly reachinga peak
at 63.8 percent in October 1984. The CPI level continued to go up
till the end of the year although the year-on-vear inflation rate start-
ed to go down. The decline in the inflation rate is due to the high
CPI levels in November and December of 1983.
This section discusses the effects of the various measures adopted
by government during the crisis period on inflation.
Under fixed exchange rate, balance-of-payments deficits, by
accommodating excess demand, reflect part of the inflationary pres-
sure that is not translated in actual price increases. When the balance-
of-payments deficits become unsustainable, the economy could
either (a) resort to more import controls including quantitative res-
trictions (QRs) and other exchange controls, or (b) devalue its cur-
rency. If more QRs are imposed to arrest growing deficits, excess
demand (now unaccommodated) would result. As a consequence,
the price level would rise giving way to the inflationary pressure. De-
valuation, on the other hand, would directly raise the price of trad-
ables, thereby curbing demand for these products and relieving the
excess demand pressure. In both.cases, the price level rises. In the
former case, however, the increase in price is a premium to producers
of commodities affected by the QRs (and importers given the license
to import these commodities), whereas in the latter case, exporters
and producers of import substitutes are uniformly rewarded.
In response to the balance of payments crisis, the government
used both measures. More exchange controls were imposed while at
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Table V.4
YEAR-ON-YEAR INFLATION RATES, PHILIPPINES
Month Inflation,Rate
1983
January 6.9
February 6.7
March 6.4
April 6.2
May 6.7
june 7.3
July 7.9
August 9.1
September 9.1
October 10.3
November 16.8
December 26_1
1984
January 33.3
February 36.6
March 39.3
April 40.7
May 42.1
June 49.0
July 58.0
August 60.4
September 63.6
• October 63.8
November 60.6
Source: National Censusand Statistics, Office,
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the same time the peso was devalued. As discussedabove, both mea-
sures are necessarily inflationary. It is, however, difficult to say how
much is due to devaluation and how much is caused by more con-
trols.
From June 1983 to October 1984, the peso was depreciated
from 1_11 per dollar to around tD20 per dollar. This converts to a
nominal appreciation of the dollar by around 82 percent. Inflation
during the same period wasaround 68 percent (this is the percentage
change in the GDP deflator). It is difficult to determine how much of
this was due to devaluation since other factors worked simultaneous-
ly - e.g., exchange controls, monetary and fiscal policies. What is
more important to note is that the increase in the price level does not
necessarily offset the effects of devaluation.
To assess the effects of the various measures on inflation,
Mariano's (1984) inflation model is used. The said model regressed
the consumer price index (CPI) against the following variables: (1)
the average wholesale posted price of petroleum products
(PMOILDP); (2) Hongkong blackmarket to official exchange rate
ratio (ERMBMERP); (3) total domestic liquidity as a percent of GNP
(TOTTGQ3); (4) annual import price index for non-fuels multiplied
by(1+T)/(1+T1972) 3/ and the ratio between the current ex-
change and the exchange rate in 1972 (PMPES); (5)natural loga-
rithm of the average percentage increase in the price ceilings for
food items controlled by the Price Stabilization Council (PCFOOD-
3L); (6) average yield of 91-day Treasury Bill (91-DAY); (7) legisla-
ted effective minimum wage rate (WLNANCR); (8) peso-denomina-
ted export price index for all commodities (PXPEXP); and (9) lagged
values of CPI. Annex III gives the full description of the said model.
The average wholesale price of petroleum products rose by 130
percent in the 18-month period covering June 30, 1983 to October
30, 1984. Over a quarter of this (or 34.1 percentage points) is attri-
butable to the imposition of additional taxes on petroleum products.
The tax on petroleum products expressed in pesosper liter ballooned
by 270 percent on the averagefor the same reference period.
Using actual values of the independent variables, Mariano's
(1984) inflation model predicted the inflation rate to be 10.23
and 48.91 percent, respectively for 1983 and 1984. However, had
there been no change in petroleum product taxes the simulated
inflation rate is 10.1 percent for 1983 and 44.1 percent for 1984.
This indicates that 0.1 percentage point (or 1 percent in proportional
terms) of the inflation rate in 1983 was due to the increased tax on
3/Where T = tariff.
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petroleum products. In 1984, additional petroleum product taxes
accounted for 4.8 percentage points (or 9.8 percent) of the inflation
rate for the year.
The same inflation model predicted the inflation rate in 1983
to be 10.22 and that in 1984 to be 48.44 percent had there been
no additional import surcharge on non-fuel imports. This implies
that a minimal 0.01 percentage point in 1983 and 0.47 percentage
point in 1984 of the inflation rate is due to the import surcharge.
Price ceilings of PSC-covered commodities have increased on
16 occasionssince June 1983. The adjustments in l_heprice ceilings
of these food items caused the CPI to move up. Rice, the single
most important item in the consumer basket, has a weight of 11.6
percent while corn constitutes 3.2 percent of the CPI basket.
Together with pork, chicken, eggs,sugar, milk and canned fish,
these items constitute about 25 percent of the basket. For the
last 18 months, these items have increased by 96 percent on the
average. _Using the inflation model, theseprice increaseshave contri-
buted 0.05 percentage point to the annualized inflation rate for
1983 and 0.65 percentage point to the 1984 inflation rate.
Another group of commodities which have been severely affected
by the present crisis are the petroleum products. For the last
eighteen months, the average wholesale price of these products has
risen by 129.7 percent. This is in response to the devaluations as
well as to the additional tax impositions. The devaluations on 23
June 1983, 5 October 1983 and 6 June 1984 and the floating of the
peso since October 1984 increased the peso cost of fuel imports.
Additional ad valorem tax on imports of petroleum products through
Executive Order Nos. 918, 946, and 955, further increased the do-
mestic prices of petroleum products. Moreover, the government
took these occasions to increasethe specific tax components of the
petroleum products. These measures were adopted to meet the
government's requirements of higher revenues. However, being
committed to ensuring stable and low prices to low-income con-
sumersand industrial users,the socialized pricing schemehas been
retained. Thus, petroleum products usually used by the lower
income groups and the industrial sector are still priced relatively
lower than the rest.
Looking at the composition of the CPI basket, it is apparent
that the averagehousehold would be most sensitive to increasesin
the prices of diesel, kerosene and LPG. Using the inflation model,
the elasticity of inflation with respect to petroleum prices is .155
in the short-run and .687 in the long-run. Translated in terms of
impact on the CPI, the 5-step adjustment in the pricesof petroleum
72
products since June 1983 have resulted in an additional increase
of 1.46 percentage points in the annualized inflation rate in 1983
and 13.61 percentagepoints in 1984.
Upward adjustments in wages have been implemented to help
workers cope with increasesin prices of commodities and services.
But one may ask if these wage increaseshave led to more price
increases. The issue,therefore, is to what extent thesewage adjust-
mentsare inflationary.
According to the inflation model, a one-percent change in the
legislatedwages will lead to a 0.24 percent increasein the inflation
rate. The low elasticity would seem to indicate that increasesin
wage rate would not leadto inflation ratesashighascan be expected
from similar increasesin pricesof petroleum products. Specifically,
the five recent wage orders have resulted in 0.47 percentage point
increase in the inflation rate in 1983 and 3.75 percentagepoints in
1984.
The relatively weak effects of minimum wage increasescould
be attributed to two factors: 1) the weak enforcement of the legisla-
tion, and 2) the policy with regardto wage adjustments. Looking at
the historically legislatedwage series,it seemsthat wages have been
adjusted asa reaction to increasesin the costof living.
In the monetary sector, there were three major policy instru-
ments used by the government - reserverequirements, rediscounting
and open market operations. Asdiscussedin the previous chapter,
these measuresaffected total liquidity and interest rates- two
variables which proved to be very important in Mariano's inflation
model. Indeed, regression resultsfor the model show that inflation
is most sensitive to changes in total liquidity as a percentage of
GNP (TL/GNP), having the highest long-run (inflation) elasticity
of 0.760 while the 91-day Treasury Bill rate ranks third with long-
run elasticity of 0.353.
As a result of the various measures,total liquidity (as measured
by M3) rose from lt99.8B in June 1983 to t_110.9B in November
1984, with very minimal fluctuations in between (see Table V.5).
As a percent of GNP, this representsa change from a rate of 1.97
in june 1983 to 2.44 in November 1984.
Fixing the TL/GNP rates at June 1983 level, simulation of the
model shows that thesechangesin TL/GNP accounted for additional
percentage points in annualized inflation rate of 0.19 in 1983 and
6.66 in 1984. For 1984, this represented around 14 percent of
total inflation in 1984.
The 91-day Treasury Bills rate (91-day T-B) was used in the
model to serve as proxy for interest rate. Table V.6 gives the rates
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TableV.5
TOTAL LIQU IDITY AND TOTAL LIQUIDITY/GNP,
1983AND 1984
Total Liquidiwa/ TL/GNPb/
1983 1984 1983 1984
January 94,730.5 112,153.0 1.870 2.342
February 95,476.0 112,497;0 1.885 2.349
March 96,774_6 116,259.0 1.911 2.428
April 97,418.2 116,248_0 1.923 2.427
May 98,710.2 114,928;0 1.949 2.400
June 99,789.1 112,036.0 1,970 2.339
July 99,249.8 111,303.0 2,060 2.447
August 99,548.6 110,349.0 2.067 2.426
September 100,722:8 108,266.0 2.091 2.380
,October 103,607.3 108,160.0 2.151 2.378
November 107,850.6 110,911.0 2.239 2.438
December 112,962.O 2.345
a/In millionl_.
b/Computed usingthe semestralvaluesof GNP (at constant1972 prices).
Source: Central Bank, Department of Economic Research-Domestic,National
Accounts Staff, NEDA.
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TableV.6
ANNUAL YIELD ON 91-DAY TREASURY BILL RATES,
1983-1984
(In Percent)
I ii
1983 1984
January 14.04 15.63
February 14.05 16.32
March 14.04 16.54
April 14;03 16.86
May 13;99 19.78
June 13:56 26.63
July 13;70 31.62
August 14:06 33.54
September 14;30 37.78
October 14.58 42.04
November 15.04 43.00
December 15.38 42.22
Source: Central Bank, Deportment of Economic Reseorch-Domest/c.
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during the period 1983 to 1984. It shows a sharp and steady in-
crease from 13.6 percent in June 1983 to. 44.2 percent in December
1984.
Again, fixing the 91-day T-B rate at its June 1983 level and
simulating what would have been the inflation rate using the infla-
tion model, results show that these changes brought about additional
percentage points in the annualized inflation rate of 1.04 in 1983
and -/.81 in 1984. For 1984, this contributed around 16 percent
to the total inflation rate.
These are not insignificant results. They show a combined
effect of around 30 percent on inflation, arising from policy actions
in the monetary sector alone. There may have been trade-offs
between inflation and unemployment (and output). Still, it is im-
portant to note how sensitive prices are to the monetary policy
measures.
V.2 OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS
The various measures adopted by government to improve the
balance of payments position have inevitably impinged on output
and employment. As discussed above, both fiscal and monetary
policies generally tended to be deflationary, especially towards
the second semester of 1984. This came at a time when prices of
exportables, notably sugar and metal products, were still depressed
and natural calamities affected the harvest of key agricultural regions
in the country. The series of de facto devaluations effected during
the period raised the cost of imported raw materials badly needed
by import-dependent industries. The foreign exchange squeeze
coupled with the tight credit policy of the Central Bank prompted
producers to slow down production.
Table V.-/ presents the quarterly growth rates of output for
major industrial sectors. Agriculture, fishery and forestry posted
negative growth rates starting the second quarter of 1983 up to
the first quarter of 1984. This was due to the combined effect of
bad weather conditions, low international price for sugar, and high
prices of inputs, notably fertilizer and pesticides. Although a
positive growth rate was registered in the second and third quarters
of 1984, a huge drop in agricultural output is expected towards
the last quarter of 1984 due to the two typhoons that devastated
the crops in the Visayas and Mindanao and to disappointingly high
interest rates on borrowed funds.
The industrial sector as a whole started to post a negative growth
after the first de facto devaluation in 1983 and has never recovered
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since then. Among the industrial groups, mining and quarrying
suffered most. Aside from depressedmetal and mineral pricesin the
world market, high cost of energy and prohibitive interest rateson
working capital contributed to the decline of its output. Several
mining firms simply ceasedoperation during this period.
One seeming bright spot that can be gleaned from Table V.7
is the positive growth rate registered by the construction industry
group for the third quarter of 1984. But this was mainly due to the
42.6 percent increase in government expenditure on construction
during the same period. The electricity, gas and water industry
group alsoshowed a consistentpositivegrowth rate during the period
under study. The government's policy to give priority to this indus-
try group helps explain its positive growth. Note, however, that
the quarterly growth ratesof this sector in 1984 were considerably
lower than those in 1983 for the comparable period, suggestingthat
this sector was also severelyaffected by the economic crisis.
The service sector supporting the agricultural and industrial
sectorssuffered the same fate. The output of finance and housing
industry group dropped precipituously in the third quarter of 1984
as a result of a series of bank runs, high default rates, high yields
for competing government financial instruments, specifically Central
Bank and treasury bills, and high interest rate that practically
ravagedthe housing industry. Only trade performed well during the
period. Heavy drawdown on inventories made possible the positive
growth rate for this industry group during the period of analysis.
The economy as a whole performed miserably. GDP growth
rate continued to slide down starting from the second quarter of
1983 up to the fourth quarter of 1984. While the economies of
other ASEAN countries grew at an enviable rate in 1984, the Philip-
pine economy shrank by 4.0 percent in the same year (according
to NEDA's advanced estimate) given the same international environ-
ment (seeTable V.8).
The general slowdown of the economy has indeed posed a great
problem to labor absorption. There is no doubt that government
favors high employment. In fact, one of the reasonsoften cited for
taking over ailing corporations especially during this crisis period
is to savejobs. At the same time, it is government's avowed policy
to protect worker's wages from being eroded in times of escalating
prices, hence the minimum wage law. What have been the effects
of the series of minimum wage adjustments and tight monetary
and fiscal measuresadopted by government during the crisis period
on employment?
Table V.9 gives information on the establishmentsand workers
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Table V.8
REAL GDP GROWTH RATES FOR ASEAN COUNTRIES
1982 1983 1984
Philippines 2.4 1.1 - 4.0
Indonesia 5.0 3.0 4.2
Malaysia 4.6 5.6 5.5
Singapore 6.3 6.1 8.6
Thailand 4.5 5.8 5.6
Sources:NEDA,' The National IncomeAccounts l(various issues)for the Philip-
pinesandVillegas,"Brightening Up the Philippine Road Show," (1984)
for othercountries
terminated/affected due to economic conditions reported by the
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE): / The number of
establishments resorting to shutdown/retrenchment for economic
reasons went up from 1,267 in 1983 to 2,134 in 1984. Consequent-
ly, the number of workers terminated as a result of shutdown/re-
trenchment also increased from 75,428 in 1983 to 86,186 in 1984.
Moreover, the number of establishments resorting to reduced work-
ing time rose from 152 in 1983 to 310 in 1984, thereby adversely
affecting 15,057 workers in 1983 and 29,910 workers in 1984.
Massive layoffs occurred in the manufacturing sector which was
affected mainly by lack of raw materials and a slump in demand.
Data from the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO)
reveal that the unemployment rate has gone up from 4.6 percent
during the third quarter of 198'3 to 6.2 percent during the third
quarter of 1984 (see Table V.IO). The figures may seem low con-
sidering the massive layoffs that took place during this period.
The NCSO and MOLE data could be reconciled by noting the sig-
nificant increase in the underemployment rate from 30.1 percent
during the third quarter of 1983 to 36.5 percent during the first
quarter of 1984. It is likely that workers who were laid off are now
4/The MOLE data are taken only from business establishments that reported layoffs
voluntarily. Thus_ the figures reported above may understate the actual figures if all esta-
blishments affected were included,
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Table V.9
ESTABLISHMENTS AND WORKERS TERMINATED/AFFECTED
january to December1983 and 1984
jan.-Dec. Jan.-Dec.P/ % Increase
1983 1984 (Decrease)
I. A. Establishmentsresortingto
shutdown/retrenchmentfor
economicreasons 1,267 2,134 68.4
Permanent 11S 195 69.6
Temporary 1,152 1,939 68.3
B. Workersterminateddue to
shutdown/retrenchmentfor
economicreasonsaj 75,428 86,186 14.3
Permanent 18,047 36,795 103.9
Temporarily 48,862 27,391 (41..5)
Averageduration (weeks) 8.96 10.6 18.3
Indefinite - 7,301 -
Not stated 10,519 14,699 39.7
II. A. Establishmentsresortingto
reducedworkingbecauseof
economicreasons 152 310 103.9
B. Workersaffectedby
reducedworktime becauseof
economicreasons 15,057 29,910 98.6
II1. Industry
Agriculture, fishery,forestry 7,218 2,555 (64.6)
Manufacturing 55,613 54,834 (1.4)
MiningandQuarrying 1,685 5,957 253.5
Electrical,gasand water 16 138 762.5
Construction 2,814 5,957 110.7
Wholesale/RetallTrade 3,545 6,171 74.1
Transportation,storageand
communication 1,745 3_911 124.1
Financing,insurance,real
estateandbusinessservices - 3,432 -
Community,socialandpersonal
services 2,792 3,258 16.7
p/preliminary (upto December20, 1984)
a/Includestermination of indefiniteduration.
Sourceof data: Ministry of Labor and Employment.
8O
TableV.10
UNEMPLOYMENTANDUNDEREMPLOYMENTRATES,PHILIPPINES
i I
Period UnemploymentRate UnderemploymentRate
i
1983: I 5.9 30.9
1983: III 4.6 30.1
1983: IV 4.1 31.8
1984: I 6.3 36.5
1984: III a/ 6.2 n.a.
a/Preliminawestimate.
Source:NotionalCensusandStatisticsOffice.
taking on even odd and irregular jobs tobe able to earn any amount
to meet their mostbasicneeds.
Consideringthat higher wages imply higher costsof production,
then this could possibly havebeen a major factor in the decisionof
employers to lay off some of their workers. However, the decline
in employment could not be attributed mainly to the increase in
wages. The loosenessin the implementation of wage legislations
seemsto indicate a slight bias of government legislation towards
greater employment over higher incomesfor workers. The govern-
ment's industrial relations policy showsthe samebiasso that restric-
tions on work stoppage are justified if they are inimical to the
interests of businessowners. Finally, the limited extent of union
organization, together with the high rates of unemployment
and underemployment has not bolstered the potential of labor
unions as enforcers oi: labor legislation. On thesebases,Tidalgo and
Esguerra (1982)conclude that labor legislation cannot be consi-
dered a factor militating againstthe fuller employment of the coun-
try's labor resources. Instead, other factors, specifically lack of raw
materials resulting from import controls, tight credit and a slump
in demand, weigh more heavily in the decision of employers to lay
off someof their workers.
The results of NEDA-SCO's Survey of Key Manufacturing
Enterprises are quite instructive (see Table V.11). The monthly
81
Table V,11
ANNUALIZED MONTHLY GROWTH RATES OF VALUE OF PRODUCTION,
COMPENSATION, EMPLOYMENT, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND
WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX
(1981=100)
Month Value of Compen- Employ- CPI WPI
Production sation ment
1983 17.2 8.4 -2.8 10.9 18.0
January 4.1 3.5 -5.5 4.7 10.5
February 13.6 3.0 -6.0 6.5 11.6
March 16:9 5.8 -8.1 6.3 9.7
April 12.5 6.6 -2.3 6.2 9.7
May 15.4 6.5 -1.4 6.0 9.5
June 19.0 6.0 -1.4 7.5 10.9
j uly 12.8 5.4 -0.9 8.4 14.3
August 18.3 10.9 -1.5 8,7 14.2
September 25.3 10,3 -0,8 8,7 13.4
October 24.5 12.0 -1.6 11.7 23_3
November 19.2 11.1 -1.8 22.4 34.9
December 25.1 18.0 -2.3 32.3 50.4
1984
january 35.4 178 -3.1 37.5 52.7
February 37.2 18;5 -2.4 40:0 54.2
March 28.7 18.4 -3.2 40.6 54.0
April 39.5 19.1 -4.4 40_7 55.8
May 42.9 21.3 -6.3 43_3 60.2
june 42.1 23.9 -7,8 52.5 77,0
]uly 57.8 34.8 -7.6 58.3 78.2
August 48.4 26-6 -6.1 60.5 78.2
September 40.7 21 ;9 -7.2 62.9 86.9
Source:SKEM Industry Trends,NEDA Statistical Coordination Office (September, 1984).
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inflation rate based either on CPI or WPI outstripped the monthly
growth rate of the value of production starting November 1983,
a month after the first debt moratorium wasdeclared, up to Septem-
ber 1984. This implies that the real output of the 200 manufac-
turing enterprises included in the sample markedly declined during
that period. At the same time, the rate at which enterprises reduced
their labor force also jumped up, especially in 1984. Although
compensation of employees also increased during this period, the
rate of increasewas less than one-half of the inflation rate, indicating
that employees of the 200 key enterprises suffered a substantial
cut in their real wage.
In summary, the tight monetary and fiscal measures initiated
by government to improve the balance of payments position, accom-
panied by the foreign exchange squeeze, have immediate and pro-
found effects on output, employment and wages of laborers. Their
favorable effect on prices will take some time. So, during the adjust-
ment period, sectors dependent on government expenditures and im-
ported raw materials as well as the labor sector will continue to feel
the pain brought about by the tight monetary and fiscal measures.
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Annex I
SURPLUS (DEFICITS) OF THIRTEEN NON-FINANCIAL
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS
(In Million Pesos)
Corporation 1981 1982 1983 1984
National PowerCorporation (NPC) -5,134 -5,387 -7,080 -6,126
PhilippineNationalOil Company
(PNOC) -3,226 617 -1,1 87 967
MetropolitanWaterworksand
SewerageSystem (MWSS) -602 -797 -1,252 -1,229
NationalIrrigation
Administration(NIA) -1,206 -lt469 -1,649 -2,087
NationalDevelopment
Corporation(NDC) -1,200 -1,815 -1,027 -323
Export ProcessingZone
Authority (EPZA) -90 -91 -77 -78
Light Rail Transit
Authority (LRTA) -6 -437 -1,665 -1,327
Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) -223 --167 -189 -149
Metro ManilaTransit _
Corporation(MMTC) -125 -36 29 -3
National Electrification
Administration (NEA) -487 -653 -782 -774
National HousingAuthority (NHA) -559 -536 -667 -392
PhilippineNational Railways(PNR) -131 -119 -57 -140
PhilippinePortsAuthority (PPA) -557 -190 -69 -658
1
TOTAL -13,546 -11,080 -15,672 -12,319.
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Annex III
DESCRIPTION OF MARIANO'S INFLATION MODEL
A. EstimatedEquation:
CPI - 13.504+ .13401 ERBMERP
+ 1.3881 CPI (-1)
- .61373 CPI (-2) + .027695 PXPEXP
+ .061682 PMOILDP + 4.7833 TOTTGQ3
+ 1.9392 PMPES+ .564 91-DAY
+ .25202 WLNANCR + .43344 PCFOOD3L
B. Definition of Variables:
CPI = Monthly consumer price index for the
Philippines, in percent (baseyear: 19_72).
ERBMERP = lO0*Hongkong Banknote Rate _i_ / $) /
Official (_/$) ExchangeRate.
PXPEXP = Peso-denominatedexport price index for
all commodities (baseyear: 1972).
PMOILDP = Average wholesale posted price of petro-
leum products, in centavosper liter.
TOTTGQ3 = TLG  TLG(-1) + TLG (-2) + TLG(-3).
TLG = TL/GNPSEM
TL = Total domestic liquidity, in billion pesos.
GNPSEM = Semestral real GNP, in 1972 billion pesos.
PMPES = PMUSNF2* (1 + TARIFF) / (1 +
TARIFF (1972))* ER (month) /ER
(1972).
PMAUSNF2 = Linear interpolation of the ($ denominat-
ed) annual import price index for non-
fuels (in decimal; baseyear: 1972).
TARIFF = Simple average (across items) of tariffs on
imports plus additional ad valorem duties
on imports, in decimal.
ER (month) = Average exchange rate for the month, in
$1.
TARIFF (1972) = .45
ER(1922) = P6.671/$I.
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91-DAY = Average yield of 91-DAY Treasury Bill, in
percent.
WLNANCR = Legislated effective minimum wage rate
for non-agricultural workers in Metro
Manila (f_/day).
PCFOOD3L = Natural Logarithm of PCFOOD3.
PCFOOD3 = Average percentage increase (relative to
the price ceilings in February 1980) in
the price ceilings for food items control-
led by the Price Stabilization Council.
C. Methodology of Estimating Inflationary Effects:
The inflation model was used to determine the inflationary
effects of the various measuresadopted during the 18-month period
covered by the study. The impact of these measureswere reflected
on the variablesincluded in the model.
To get the individual contribution of each of the measures(e.g.
wage adjustments), the June 1983 value for the variable was re-
tained throughout the simulation period from July 1983 to Decem-
ber 1984, while the actual valueswere used for the other indepen-
dent variables. The annualized inflation rates for 1983 and 1984
were computed using the estimated monthly CPIs. This was com-
pared with the annualized inflation rates derived from the simula-
tion exercise using the actual valuesfor all the explanatory variables.
The difference between the tWO setsof rates wasinterpreted as the
increase in the inflation rate due to the change in the variable whose
value washeld constant at itsJune 1983 level.
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